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Don't dramatise pipeline issue, warns Schmidt

…cellor Helmut Schmidt has told a …conference in San Francisco that the …rian pipeline dispute was a family af… …that should not be dramatised. "I am …ly sure that there is not going to be a …ce in the Atlantic Alliance," he said.

…onn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has referred to the squabbles bet… …en Europe and America as an inter… …ional incident of middling serious…ss.

The French, especially Foreign Mi…ster Claude Cheysson, even see signs …a progressive parting of the ways.

So it is time to agree on where the …fferences are. It is in their contrasting …ws on what the Europeans still refer …as detente.

In 1972 President Nixon reached so… …n agreement with Mr Brezhnev on …iples that were to govern relations …een the United States and the So…viet Union.

…as a bid to forestall nuclear war …the two superpowers submitting to a …code of behaviour.

In order to ensure that the risk of a …lear holocaust never arose the two …tries undertook neither directly nor …rectly to attempt to gain an advan…e over each other.

A year later Moscow threatened nu… …hostilities in connection with the …Kippur War, while since 1975 the … Union has had no scruples in … to gain the edge in world affairs …erica's expense.

…done so via Angola, the horn of … the Middle East (by supporting …PLO) and Afghanistan. Poland is … the last link so far in the chain.

…ident Reagan has not concluded … should no longer be any ne…tion with the Soviet Union. In… …he has offered to hold compre… …e disarmament talks.

…e is no longer prepared to give …Russians the benefit of advance …ence. His dealings with the Soviet … are cool and businesslike.

…latest instance is his decision not …fy treaties on a total nuclear test …til opportunities of on-the-spot …ion have been improved.

…is the background against which …e arguments must be seen with …Mr Reagan has personally re… …d to the French government's in… …ns to French companies to break … embargo on the Soviet gas pipe… …tract.

…he argues, Europe will be mak… …dependent on Moscow for …upplies and thus be laying itself …blackmail.

…the Europeans will be help… …Soviet Union to earn between …d $12bn a year in foreign ex… …that could be invested in arma…

…the deal by which Europe is to supply pipeline and equipment in return for gas piped from Soviet Siberia is a shot in the arm for a Soviet economy with its back to the wall.

Basically the Europeans have had the same experience with the Russians as the Americans have. The Soviet Union exploited the detente era to have its sphere of influence in Europe guaranteed in treaties between Western Europe and the East Bloc. At the same time it build up an alarming superiority of triple-warhead SS-20 missiles aimed at free Europe.

But the Europeans, far from concluding that their detente philosophy needs reappraisal, seek salvation in disarmament negotiations.

They do so even though the results of disarmament talks over the past 30 years cannot inspire confidence in anyone.

From the European viewpoint the gas-for-pipelines deal is extremely important:

First, it establishes a link between vital Soviet interests and those of free Europe, ties that will make Moscow behave more cordially toward Europe.

Second, it will establish a community of interest between the Soviet Union and Western Europe on energy policy and in relation to the oil-rich Middle East, the politically most volatile region in the world.

Third, the billion-dollar deal will establish a favourable climate for disarmament talks.

The hard core of the Euro-American misunderstanding is that President Reagan is convinced the West must, in all sectors of world affairs in which the Soviet Union builds up power, establish a countervailing power.


The Europeans feel that in their part of world, due as Bonn feels to the East Bloc treaties, this inexorable need does not apply. They claim this is a part of their quality of life.

Unless the on going clash between Europeans and Americans is thoroughly settled there will be a serious risk of the irritation assuming irreconcilable proportions.

The Europeans will then continue to seek the cause of conflict in the fact that in the United States every new President takes over backed by an administration with little experience in world affairs.

They will turn up their noses at the philistines in the White House and rely on having in Mr Shultz a good friend at

Continued on page 2



Getting together ... Chancellor Schmidt and American Secretary of State George Shultz at their Press conference in San Francisco. (Photo: dpa)

Washington leaves the steel door slightly ajar

Washington has decided not yet to burn its bridges in the steel clash with the European Community and make countervailing duties on EEC steel exports permanent.

The US Department of Commerce decided on 10 June to impose duties on steel imports from seven of the 10 Common Market countries.

Its aim is to offset the effects of government subsidies. The Americans say these are allowing the imported steel to undercut American steel.

The amount of the duty depends on the amount of subsidy in each case. British steel is the worst hit. It faces duty of 40 per cent.

After the hard line taken by US representatives of late it comes as a surprise to learn that Washington new welcomes the latest EEC proposal for further talks.

The US government seems to have had misgivings whether its measures would gain Gatt approval.

Gatt Secretary-General Arthur Dunkel of Switzerland has said he takes a dim view of a self-restraint agreement by which the Common Market would limit EEC steel exports to the United States.

But it looks like one is in the pipeline. In agreeing on a fresh offer to the United States the EEC countries have at least succeeded in restoring solidarity and reestablishing a joint approach.

A week earlier it had looked like a free-for-all, with the four most seriously affected EEC countries, Britain, France, Belgium and Italy, keen to negotiate bilaterally with Washington. But they were unable to come to terms.

EEC solidarity is not unshakable, however. Britain may have agreed to empower the European Commission in Brussels to hold talks with Washington on behalf of the Ten, but it is continuing to try and come to bilateral terms.

Understandably so, perhaps, since Britain is hardest hit by the US duties, which in the case of British steel amount to about 40 per cent.

France in particular warns against overrating EEC solidarity. It could easily disintegrate if the United States were to get tougher against individual Common Market countries.

The authorities on both sides of the Atlantic are sure to realise that the clash over the tougher US embargo on East Bloc trade is more important.

It will also have more far-reaching consequences for relations between the United States and its Western European allies than the steel clash.

The firm line taken by the Common Market countries in favour of the Soviet gas pipeline contract will continue to have repercussions on Washington's approach to EEC steel exports.

So it is doubtful whether high hopes of an agreement on steel will be fulfilled for the time being. But the prospects of both sides taking a more common-sense view are at least better.

The position of the steel industry is far from good on either side of the Atlantic. Thousands of jobs are at stake. An open trade war and protectionist measures to keep out imports would be ruinous for both sides.

Hans-Peter Ott

(Kieler Nachrichten, 26 July 1982)

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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Beirut siege: how will PLO cards land on the table?

Is Mr Brezhnev right in saying Israel's military success against the PLO and Syrian forces in Lebanon is a political and moral defeat for Jerusalem?

The Israeli campaign has been equally condemned in East and West, although for different reasons. This criticism alone would seem to bear out the Soviet leader's claim.

Mr Begin may still feel the more enemies one has, the more to one's credit it is, but the amount of hostility towards him by friends must surely make him think twice.

Memories of Israeli border settlements regularly shelled by the PLO have paled in comparison with Israel's massive response. All that now counts is that response.

World opinion now points an accusing finger at the path of bloodshed that has taken Israeli soldiers into the heart of Beirut.

It is now the Palestinians, surrounded in the western part of the Lebanese capital, who enjoy sympathy, both human and political.

Above all, Mr Begin's aggression has succeeded in fostering a greater awareness than ever before of the fate that has befallen the Palestinian people.

There is a growing understanding of the call, so stubbornly resisted by Jerusalem, for self-determination for Arabs who have lived under military occupation for 15 years on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

Israel has also succeeded in saddling its major protecting power, the United States, with a second angel of mercy role, and this could prove of crucial importance for further developments in the Middle East.

The Americans are doing all they can to prevent the annihilation of the PLO *troops under siege.*

One may wonder why the Israelis did not immediately use their military superiority to occupy all Beirut. Maybe they were afraid their own losses would be too heavy. Maybe they were worried about even tougher criticism.

They may have halted their advance at the last moment because, basically, they feel Yasser Arafat is the only Palestinian leader Mr Begin might one day be able to talk to.

Both would naturally deny this strongly, Mr Arafat because he could no longer be sure of his life, Mr Begin because he would otherwise be setting aside everything he stood for politically.

But Washington has taken a step closer to the PLO leadership, although it has yet to cross the threshold of official recognition.

And it even looks as though the PLO leadership is prepared to honour this quasi-upgrading, with PLO opinion gradually to be coming round to the idea of acknowledging Israel's right to exist.

It is much too early to be optimistic about the future. For one, Mr Arafat does not exercise control over all Palestinian organisations.

Indeed, some virtually abhor his partly successful bids to make diplomatic progress. They see Palestinian salvation, as do extremist Arab states, solely in an inexorable struggle to destroy the hated state of Israel.

For another, the Lebanon knot has yet to be severed. The main problem is where the Palestinians are to go.

Israel's view is that they should go to Jordan, it being the Arab Palestinian state for which the homeless people so long, but the PLO was expelled from Jordan with Israeli assistance in heavy fighting in 1970.

Besides, does Jerusalem really believe Israel would be better protected from PLO raids if the PLO were based east of the Jordan and not on the 1967 frontier?

Do a few dozen kilometres more or less make the slightest difference given today's advanced arms technology?

Saudi Arabia and Syria may have suggested transferring the Palestinians from Beirut to the north of Lebanon and later to several Arab states, but that can only be an intermediate solution.

The Palestinians, whether as refugees or as people expelled, remain a potential source of unrest, even in the Arab world, because they have been uprooted.

Yet one can understand Jerusalem objecting to their transfer to the West Bank and to the establishment of a fresh state, whether in confederation with Jordan or not.

Israel is likely to object to any such idea for as long as it represents a constant threat to its further existence.

Even once all foreign troops have been withdrawn from Lebanon it will remain difficult to ensure the country's survival as an independent state.

There are so many hostile groups in Lebanon that have for so long been jockeying for supremacy.

But a solution to the Palestinian question will be more difficult still. It can certainly not be solved with the sword, as Mr Begin has tried.

The key to a solution is not in Israel's hands alone. It is not for Jerusalem to decide whether military victory is to be followed by political success.

Political success must, in this context, be taken to mean a further step towards lasting peace in the Middle East.

Many hands hold keys to peace. They include the Arab states and the Palestinians, but above all the superpowers.

As long as they feel governed primarily by considerations of influence, in the guise of friendship with one country or another in a region where there have been flare-ups for decades their protégés will not be prepared to abandon position that block the path to peace.

The Israelis and the PLO are both protégés in this category. They also keep each other company, as reluctant bedfellows perhaps, as the worst troublemakers in the region.

Reiner Dederichs
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 22 July 1982)

Continued from page 1

the State Department who will ensure the worst does not come to the worst.

They will quietly forget the fact that it was they who forced Secretary of State Haig into assuming this role, thereby contributing toward his downfall.

Mr Reagan on the other hand could increasingly succumb to the temptation to feel that ties between Western Europe and its protecting power were stable enough for him to be able to afford to boost his prospects of re-election by a demonstration of strength in the wrong context.

He can hardly expect to impress voters with the disappointing outcome so far of his economic policies.

Since M. Mitterrand and Herr Schmidt are in similar domestic difficulties they might also hit on the idea of a national demonstration to challenge the United States and impress their voters.

That would be the surest way of testing the tensile strength of the North Atlantic pact.

Fortunately, matters have not yet reached this stage. Chancellor Schmidt, currently in America, is trying to play down the Euro-American clash.

He may not be entirely blameless for having brought things to a head in the past, but in the interest of both sides he should be wished success.

Wilfried Hertz-Eichenrode
(Die Welt, 24 July 1982)

Caught between the Koran and the Cadillac

Ayatollah Khomeini set his revolutionary guards a lofty target in saying, when ordering them to cross the border into Iraq, that the road to Jerusalem was via Baghdad.

They have since found it extremely difficult to convert into actions the words of their prophet. The campaign of vengeance that transformed the Iraqi aggressor into a defender faltered after days.

Both sides claim victories. Both are said to have had serious losses.

When Iraq's President Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to invade Iran nearly two years ago he was hoping the Arab population of the Iranian oil province, Khuzistan, would side with them.

In much the same way Ayatollah Khomeini is hoping the Shi'ite majority in Iraq will take arms against the Sunnite Baath regime in Baghdad.

So far he has hoped to no avail. The Iraqi armed forces are fighting on their home ground more resolutely and determinedly than at any time in the past 22 months.

The Iranian invasion seems to be forging unity among Iraq's Arabs regardless of their religious differences. The Shatt al Arab war is more than a clash between religions and ideologies.

Its roots lie in the historic conflict between Arabs and Persians and in the old struggle for control of the Gulf.

The outcome of the Iranian campaign of conquest, the second instalment of the Gulf War, is uncertain. Despite the momentum of the Iranian attack no-one is expecting Tehran to make it a swift victory along the lines of an Israeli blitzkrieg.

The Iranian revolutionary army is too inflexible and too motley a crew. Its success is due more to fanatical belief in the promises of the Koran than to the precision of its artillery.

Unable to make full use of the possibilities of modern warfare, the two armies face heavy losses in a costly war of attrition.

It is an unpredictable conflict that threatens to destabilise the entire oil region, an area of vital interest to the industrialised Western states.

The West can favour victory neither by the one side nor the other. A victory for Khomeini's Islamic revolution as it progressed triumphantly through Iraq, toppling the Baghdad regime, would put a Middle East that is already unstable completely out of joint.

A block of fundamentalist states extending from the borders of Afghanistan to Syria's Mediterranean coast would be an alarming bulwark of the the Islamic revolution and the starting point for a new wave of Islamic conquest.

Feudal Saudi Arabia and the conservative oil sheikhdoms in the Gulf would be furst to be threatened with the violent export of Khomeini-style revolution.

Yet the ouster of Khomeini as a result of a resounding defeat inflicted on the Iranian army in Iraq cannot be in the West's interest either.

What is to come after the death of the ageing ayatollah? Democratic resistance to the mullahs has long been crushed. The survivors are, first and foremost, well-organised militant left-wing groups that have gone underground.

The Russians, who are viewed by strictly orthodox Muslims as unbelievers, just as the Americans are, seem to be keeping their counsel and waiting for left-wing revolution.

Even if there is not a dramatic military outcome in the marshland of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the West's oil supplies and allies run a risk.

It is a risk of domestic trouble resulting from their social contradictions. People in the conservative sheikhdoms live in a confusing and contradictory world of change.

They are caught between the conflicting claims of tradition and *modernity*, between the Koran and the Cadillac, and are highly receptive to the promises of salvation by a creed that lays claim to religious certainty and unity of belief and action, life and politics.

This alarming development is all the more dangerous for the Arab states as these backward-looking hopes are fanned by the ideological pressure of progressive, modern Palestinian intellectuals who operate the levers of technocracy.

It is here that one comes full circle from Basrah to Beirut, from the Gulf War to the fighting in Lebanon by the Palestinians.

Further procrastination on the Palestinian problem and a further expulsion of refugees to neighbouring Arab countries without hope of a homeland would serve only to heighten domestic tension in the moderate Arab states.

Washington must succeed in forcing Israel to abandon its ominous policy of displacement. Otherwise the West will stand no chance of helping stability in the crisis-torn region.

Thomas Gack
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 21 July 1982)

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

SPD casts a longing glance at the opposition benches

The dispute revolving round the 1983 budget has been more or less settled. But that hasn't stopped the SPD and FDP from getting back to their favourite pastime: squabbling.

The FDP arguments, between the right and the left, about the merits or otherwise of changing coalition partners has led some in the SPD to philosophically ponder the wisdom of voluntarily ditching the government benches and going into opposition.

So the (relative) peace that descended on the SPD after its national congress in April has not even lasted until the forthcoming election in Hesse.

The determination of the Social Democrats to air their soiled linen in public and disregard anything that may smack of political necessity is almost something to be admired.

A lot of people in the party have this longing to go into opposition. And they are spread across the spectrum of party interests.

The ideological wing of the party, which abhors compromises, has long put up a front against its own government. One of these people is the Saarland politician Oskar Lafontaine who derided what he called such "secondary virtues" of the chancellor as devotion to duty, predictability and fortitude. But after all, anybody who himself lays claim to ideological purity and virtue cannot respect the described traits.

The spirit of zealotry without bounds and decency is also at the root of the scandalous comparison made by former State Secretary Günter Gaus who compared Social Democratic Chancellor Schmidt with the anti-democratic Reich Chancellor von Papen, one of the gravediggers of the Weimar Republic.

Critics of the government suggest that their party should renew itself in the opposition and stick to its principles.

The SPD is to act as a champion of ecological economy as if there could be a common denominator for the interests of the worker and those of radical environmentalists. The party is also to spearhead the struggle against the Nato medium range buildup decision in Europe.

If these self-righteous do-gooders were a closed circle they could be left to their own devices. The SPD has always had its theoreticians and they were always good for a sensation, but they never played a decisive role. What lends the opponents of an SPD in government weight is the fact that other groups pursue the same aim.

Several provincial SPD "big shots" have their own opportunistic reasons for wanting the SPD to relinquish the Bonn government. They attribute the election defeats in various states and major cities to coalition decisions.

The group of regional politicians can now also point to trade union officials who, like in the metalworkers and other unions, want to mount a mammoth demonstration this autumn against cutbacks in social benefits. Of course, none of the union officials can assume that another government would have arrived at more pleasant decisions, but this enables them to put the blame for our economic woes on Bonn and, in some cases, divert attention from their own shortcomings.

(Cartoon: Hanel/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)

Chancellor Schmidt and his party chairman, Willy Brandt, have so far successfully tried to stem the tide of discouragement.

Still, it is hard to know whether the opponents on an SPD in government in Bonn are already in the majority. One thing is certain: the SPD can no longer master its role as a government party.

As long as the only thing that mattered was how to make this country even more social and just, the political substance sufficed. But since no government is any longer in a position to hand out benefits from swelling coffers, the gears of the party works have been labouring — a party which defends every shred of social policy as if it were a piece of itself.

For leading Social Democrats like Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein it is a simple truism that "our social system cannot give more than the economy provides." But the party as a whole refuses to accept realities and draw its conclusions from them.

Berlin opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel recently said that the SPD would lose its self confidence if it has to go on constantly warding off unwelcome developments.

He is right there, but nobody forces the SPD to keep griping about the decisions of its own coalition government.

It is an essential political task to make the social security system financially viable in the 1990s. That will be the time when the workers who are today groaning under the burden of social security payments will themselves need the benefits of pensions and free health care.

Even this argument can draw votes if there is a will to put it forward. But a policy that wants the good of everybody and hurts the few rich can only be promoted from the opposition benches.

Wolfgang Mauersberg
(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 20 July 1982)

Greens accused of appealing to 'romantic conservatism'

The Greens (ecological party) are likely to be inconsistent and ineffective in the long run because of lack of coordination and a common plan, says a study produced by the SPD.

The report, which has a party political bias, accuses the Greens of having similarities with the CDU and with the more romantic of conservative ideas.

It says the Greens concentrate on putting up opposition without presenting alternatives; and that they offer catchy proposals without taking into account cost.

The study, by Rudolf Scherping (SPD member of the Rhineland-Palatinate assembly) and Joachim Hoffmann-Göttig (staff member of the SPD Bundestag group) was presented at the conference of SPD State house leaders. It was for internal party use rather than publication.

The authors took the trouble to analyse some 300 speeches of Green assembly members in Baden-Württemberg, Bremen and Berlin.

They read 970 pages of minutes covering from 1980 to 1981.

Draft bills, motions and other parliamentary initiatives of the three groupings that make up the Greens were not taken into account if dealt with only in committees.

The study stresses the lack of Green statements on such issues as the trade unions along with the Greens' "broken relationship" to the education reform period of the past 15 years.

Some of the conclusions are startling. For instance, the speeches by Green MPs in no way confirm that the Greens concentrate only on ecological issues.

Most of their speeches in Baden-Württemberg dealt with treasury matters.

This could be because money policy was on the agenda at the time, but it is nevertheless surprising that one in three Green speeches dealt with the issue.

Only one in five speeches had to do with ecological matters while 12 per cent dealt with educational affairs.

In Berlin, on the other hand, ecological matters ranked at the very top with 43 per cent. Another major subject in Bremen and Berlin was the assembly's internal affairs.

This is not surprising. The legislative integration of the Baden-Württemberg Greens went off in a rather "liberal" fashion (Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever) while the Bremen Greens had to struggle for recognition and the Berlin assembly spent weeks dealing with the issue of majorities.

There were very few speeches on economic policy and matters of principle. But even so, the study says, the "range of issues covered by the Greens was much wider than generally assumed."

The authors see themselves confirmed on another hypothesis, i.e. that the Greens concentrate on putting up an opposition without presenting alternatives.

The proposals were catchy but disregarded the amount of cash needed, and hence the possibility of putting them into practice.

Stuttgart MP Holger Heimann is seen by the authors as a typical example. He is quoted as having said: "I have no patent solution to offer now. But we want to prevent you from making ruthless and immoral decisions."

The work of the Green legislators was marked by what they call *Unterlassungsprogrammatik* (loosely, programme of omissions).

They operated dangerously close to the CDU. For example: reduction of state tasks in favour of private initiative; opposition to high state indebtedness; criticism of the social welfare state with its "mentality of diminishing personal responsibility"; the general demand for denationalisation and privatisation; a certain aloofness towards the trade unions because of their huge size; endorsement of the CDU demand for assistance for small and medium firms; more competition in the energy sector; promotion of private schools.

Such assembly speeches substantiate the criticism by the Schleswig-Holstein Social Democrat Klaus Matthiesen who says that the Greens will end up like the youth movement at the beginning of this century and that they will become an "anti-democratic, anti-socialist and elitist-bourgeois generation of dropouts from society."

Although the authors stress that there are great differences between the individual Green groupings in the three federal states (the affinity with the CDU is greatest in Baden-Württemberg and Bremen), the study nevertheless shows that the Greens have remained faithful to their main objective: grassroots democracy, decentralised decision making processes and opposition to the arms build up. They also see themselves as a protest movement.

Their only new initiative, the rejection of mammoth technologies and mammoth social structures, "is in danger of becoming no more than an idealistic hope unless parliamentary action paves the way for the realisation of this hope," the authors say.

But there is no sign of such action. "In our view, the parliamentary practice of the Greens reveals a lack of concrete action with the attendant risk that, should such action be attempted without taking social conditions into account, it would ultimately amount to no more than the formulation of romantic ideas," the authors say.

Here, the Greens act in exactly the way they accuse the established parties of acting: they restrict themselves to mudslinging.

Essentially noncommital attitude of the Greens in assemblies and their lack of a common plan of action has not detracted from their attractiveness to the public and the young voters in particular.

On the contrary: many of these attributes with their lack of clarity, their generalisation and emotionalism account for the attractiveness of the Greens.

It is this very fact that the authors regard as a particular threat to political conditions in this country. Since the Greens ultimately waste what creativity, imagination, dynamism and ideas they have and could use to do something, they create the very risk that has brought them sympathy: "The risk of massive and lasting disappointment in politics in general."

Jörg Bischoff
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 19 July 1982)

■ POLITICS

Schmude and Baum on a coalition tandem



Schmude . . . 'not afraid to get involved'.

Franz Josef Strauss, CSU leader and prime minister of Bavaria, called them the "devil's own twins within the coalition," who were systematically wrecking law and order.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, on the other hand, praised his Interior Minister Gerhart Baum (FDP) and Justice Minister Jürgen Schmude (SPD) as "a stabilising element in the coalition." The praise came at a time when the coalition was in one of its more precarious phases.

Both censure and praise referred to the two members of the Bonn cabinet who have remained unaffected by the coalition disputes over the past months and who are determined to continue their sound partnership of many years.

Though their respective ministries overlap on many points and have common objectives, the relations between Baum and Schmude go beyond the mere shoving back and forth of files and occasional personal contacts.

Their tried and proven though inconspicuous harmony has never yet been in jeopardy. It is based on a far-reaching "coincidence of views" (Schmude) on policy matters and "total agreement" on the fact that the coalition is a gain for the nation.

The somewhat ponderous Schmude (originally from East Prussia) and the more lively and spontaneous Baum (from Saxony) are almost the same age. They fight shoulder to shoulder when necessary — without ulterior motives and without tactical ploys. They are also undaunted by harsh public criticism and negative opinion surveys.

This faith in each other dates back to 1974 when both were parliamentary state secretaries at the Ministry of the Interior.

Thet was under the likeable though increasingly confused Interior Minister Werner Maihofer. "It was then that I learned what an interior minister must not do," says Schmude.

Says Schmude of Baum: "He doesn't blindly rely on experts but makes his own decisions . . . political decisions."

But Baum, too, has always had the best of experience with Jürgen Schmude.

In his first years as Interior Minister, Baum, who was under critical scrutiny as a novice, did not exactly meet with spontaneous approval and affection from his fellow cabinet members and the chancellor.

But even at that time, when Schmude still held the education portfolio, he always backed Baum and his reform projects.

Yet they do not consider themselves as personal friends. Jokes Schmude: "Our children don't see-saw together in the garden."

Even so, they are more than just temporary allies out of necessity; nor do they deal with the items on the agenda as a matter of mere businesslike devotion to duty.

Both Schmude (initially as education minister) and Baum (as interior minister) were publicly described as second best.

As Schmude frankly admits, neither of them was given his portfolio as a "celebrated top politician." The image they now enjoy and the success that has come their way are the results of hard work.

Moreover, neither of them is exactly a great orator who can inject enthusiasm into the masses.

The respect in which they are now held has other reasons.

Baum, for instance, had long talks with the ex-terrorist Horst Mahler on terrorism and all that goes with it.

Jürgen Schmude, on the other hand, gave the leftist newspaper *TAZ* an interview on very delicate issues.

Baum advised the ex-terrorist and RAF member Astrid Proll who had fled to England to turn herself in to the German police.

He also, in an unprecedented move in Germany, made two officers of the *Verfassungsschutz* (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) testify as witnesses in her subsequent trial.

And during the last hunger strike of imprisoned RAF members, Schmude went out of his way to end the dangerous fast.

Neither of the ministers earned much public acclaim for what they did. Yet it can be taken for granted that they will act in the same way should a similar situation arise in the future because "we're not afraid to get involved," as Schmude puts it.

Yet he calls himself a cautious sort of person.

This common search for new approaches — heedless of the risks — is a unifying element beyond the occasional formal handshake at cabinet meetings or similar occasions.

Both ministers take frankness and paying careful attention to what the other has to say for granted in dealing with each other. And since atmosphere and harmony flow from top to bottom rather than vice versa, the staff members of the two ministries also get along without friction.

The harmony and agreement between the two ministers is reflected in their practical day-to-day-work. Once every three weeks Baum and Schmude meet for an extended breakfast when they can discuss all topical issues in depth.

It is only natural that differences of views should crop up in such talks. But in the end their give and take attitude gains the upper hand.



Baum . . . the more optimistic by nature. (Photos: Sven Simon)

For example, while Baum called for immediate legislation when the courts and the prosecutors imposed stiff penalties for "promoting a terrorist organisation," Schmude advised waiting for a while to observe the courts' rulings. Baum took Schmude's advice.

But by and large the two men see eye to eye. Both rejected stiffer demonstration laws, and both continue to call for a more selective application of the so-called extremists' act.

Together, they managed to prevent a further watering down of the constitutional right to asylum. The list of their joint successes could be continued at will.

Much of this success in the midst of the coalition tug-of-war of the past months is due to the systematic dialogue with the parliamentary groups and their relevant committees and workshops which the two ministers organised.

Thus, for instance, Baum and Schmude have a weekly lunch meeting with four legal or domestic affairs experts of the coalition parties, when they discuss specific issues, draft bills and general strategy.

All participants say that the atmosphere and cooperation at these meetings is exemplary.

Once every three months, Baum and Schmude also meet with the presidents of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Criminal Investigation Office to discuss security problems.

This is one sector of the coalition where partnership and cooperation truly functions. Gradually, even the fighting cocks among the coalition partners are becoming aware of this.

No matter how many attacks the opposition launches, it has never succeeded in breaking down the cooperation between Baum and Schmude.

Schmude calls the attacks by Schleswig-Holstein's Interior Minister Uwe Barschel against Baum "mud-slinging" because for him Baum is "the best guarantee of security."

Barschel and all the others who present themselves to the public as "sheriffs," says Schmude, would jeopardise the internal peace of the nation.

But Schmude and Baum are not only successfully ploughing the field of interior and judiciary policy. In their many personal discussions they also talk about the Social-Liberal coalition, asking themselves "who has hurt whom when, and was it necessary?"

In a way, the two see themselves as the coalition's conscience. Although never pushy, they are convinced that they have played a role in bringing about

Continued on page 7

■ MIGRANTS

Send-them-home school is 'ruining German image'

People who want to get rid of foreigners do not understand how much they are damaging Germany's reputation in the eyes of the world, according to Lieselotte Funcke, Commissioner for Aliens' Issues in Bonn.

She says that most Germans are not unfriendly to towards foreigners. Many are helpful. But many are also worried about their jobs and what will happen in those areas where foreigners are concentrated.

Frau Funcke, who took office 18 months ago, has been trying to coordinate guest workers measures. She warns of the dangers of taking short-sighted attitudes.

Question: The aim of the Bonn government is to integrate the foreign workers though this does not exclude possible repatriation. How many foreigners can stay in this country and how many should return home?

Answer: We cannot simply deport the foreign workers and their families who have lived here for many years. Despite unemployment in this country, repatriation must remain voluntary.

Those who decide to return home should be given adequate assistance in keeping with the economic conditions in their home countries to enable them to earn a living, as for instance through cheap loans. Very small amounts — "parting gifts," so to speak — would not be helpful and could easily be misunderstood.

Those who have spent many years here and who want to stay here are entitled to the same social rights and obligations as the rest of the population. It is the policy of Bonn and the states to facilitate their and their families' integration.

Q: Demographic developments in this country indicate a major shift in the age structure of the population. The number of those retiring will be larger than those beginning their working lives. Are we prepared for the time when we might once more be faced with a labour shortage?

A: The now high ratio of school leavers will drop to 60 or 65 per cent of the present number as early as 1984/85. This includes the foreign juveniles who now live here. As a result, there will be considerably less new blood in terms of skilled labour. At the same time, more people than today will reach retirement age.

Despite microchips and structural changes on the labour market due to technology, industry and the social security funds will need both German and foreign new blood to keep industrial production, exports and social security pensions going. All this precludes a short-sighted policy.

Q: Isn't it illusory to think of integration considering the position of women especially in Islamic families. Their attitude is light years removed from our way of life?

A: It's true that the Islamic woman finds it particularly hard to adapt to our society. Researchers and practitioners confirm that such women usually live isolated among us, that they're unable to communicate with their German environment and that they are frequently totally overtaxed by working in a factory, looking after the family and inadequate housing conditions.

The first step towards integration should be to convince their husbands that it would be better for the whole family if not only the children but mothers as well learned German to enable them all to find their feet.

Bonn therefore calls for pilot projects aimed at a better orientation for women. For instance, so-called mother-child centres in Frankfurt and Nuremberg provide marriage and family counselling and suggestions for children's games. They also act as go-betweens in finding foster parents, teach reading and writing and provide language courses — all under one roof. What matters is for municipalities, organisations and citizens action groups to adopt the federal pilot schemes and practise them or develop projects of their own.

The German-Turkish family get-together in Rheinau (Bonn) earlier this year was a good example of how the shyness of guest worker families when it comes to dealing with their German environment can be overcome.

Q: "There is no future" is the attitude of many juveniles in this country. But is it not the Turkish girls who really have no future, those who are successful at school and accepted by their classmates and are then suddenly taken out of school and given in marriage by their parents to a stranger at the age of 16?

A: Changing from one country to another is particularly difficult for children anywhere in the world because they live between two home countries and two civilisations. Young people are moulded by their parents but they cannot in the long run go on living in a conflict with their environment. This tension can only be mitigated if parents, school and neighbourhood show much understanding for the problem. Though there can be no state interference in family customs, the state can provide counselling and human assistance when needed.


Q: Would it not be more humane to impose stiffer restrictions on family reunification?

A: Our constitution protects all families in this country. I consider a further restriction of entry for children who are still minors intolerable for constitutional reasons, for reasons of domestic and foreign policy considerations and for reasons of humanity and Christian principles. The immigration of new families must be prevented but not the living together of families who have been with us for years.

Q: Is there really such a thing as xenophobia? Or has this simply become a politically fashionable term today?

A: There is a militant minority of people whose slogan is "Out with the foreigners". They will never understand how much their activities harm the reputation of our country in the eyes of the world.

I have this confirmed by foreign countries with which we are on friendly terms. Most of our people are not unfriendly in their day-to-day dealings with foreigners. And in many instances they're helpful. But there can be no doubt that many Germans are worried about their jobs, problems at school and the concentration of foreigners in certain parts of a city.



Lieselotte Funcke . . . no time to be short-sighted. (Photo: Hans Windeck)

As a result, there are also critical discussions on this issue; but I also see much personal commitment by Germans who work on behalf of foreigners, be it on an honorary or a full-time basis, and who are promoting good neighbourly relations.

Q: If you were offered the same post again would you accept it despite all dificulties and despite your having no clearly defined authority in terms of a government department?

A: Yes. I want to contribute towards resolving the tension and encourage other people to think and act. This can be done even without ministerial authority and provides an opportunity to tackle the problems on a supra-ministerial basis.

Edda Zoeldi

(General-Anzeiger, 17 July 1982)

Cash for those who want to go back

The Bonn government has decided to offer repatriation incentives to foreign workers.

It is, however still debating whether to limit the immigration of dependents of foreign workers.

Though several attempts at cutting the Gordian knot have been made in the past few months, decisions have been postponed time and again pending reviews.

Both the SPD and the FDP are edging towards a decision. The Bonn cabinet has worked out where there is a consensus.

Foreigners who want to return home are to get their part of the contributions to the social security pensions scheme refunded after a brief notice period. The same applies to claims resulting from company pensions schemes and government-promoted savings.

But all this is unlikely to amount to more than DM10,000 — not enough to be an incentive for a Turk or Portuguese to leave what is no longer a hospitable country. But at least this sort of amount can be financed.

The cabinet has also agreed on what it does not want — and this should not be minimised.

Bonn has rejected the clever and comfortable way out suggested by the majority in the Bundesrat.

The federal states recommended a regulation whereby foreign workers would have to obtain residence permits for children aged over six who want to join them in this countgry.

This sort of arrangement would have enabled Bonn to shed future responsibility and the states would have been able to bar entry to the next-of-kin at will — at least in selected regions.

Thus — at least under a Social-Liberal government — there will be no bureaucratic solution that would pass authority for the handling of aliens' affairs to the municipalities.

But what is the answer? A lasting solution is becoming increasingly urgent. Family reunification has for years been nullifying the effects hoped for by imposing a ban on the hiring of foreigners. and the foreign community keeps growing.

It is mostly juveniles who keep coming and need a job instantly. Yet they are handicapped by not speaking German and having no vocational training.

Some 320,000 children of "guest workers" in German still live in their home countries, and tension between Germans and foreigners is mounting — especially in conurbations.

There are two schools of thought within the SPD/FDP government. There are those who want to leave everything as it is. They point to constitutional safeguards for the family, and parental rights.

Foreign workers are to be encouraged to bring their children to this country while they are still young through special incentives.

By attending German schools and vocational training at an early age, the children would stand a chance of becoming integrated. But so far these appeals have fallen on fallow ground.

The other group wants to give parents two years in which to decide whether they want to bring their 6- to 16-year-old children.

After that period, there should be no further family reunification, except where there is special hardship.

Those who decide that their children should stay in the home country and later change their minds and bring the children to Germany after all should be liable to be deported.

Advocates of integrated families on political and moral grounds reject this Labour Ministry proposal as being bureaucratic and inhumane.

It is, of course, easier to argue along these lines in middle-class housing areas than in big city boroughs that are overrun by foreigners.

The proponents of unlimited liberalism are also prepared to accept human hardships. Their idealistic avowals and appeals are of little use to the 12- or 15-year-olds once they find themselves in this country without speaking the language and without a job.

They also do nothing to alleviate the growing disenchantment among those German population groups who have to live with the foreigners and who fear them as rivals at school and at work.

Unhampered immigration must aggravate the problems that exist between foreigners and their environment. On the other hand, immigration restrictions lead to problems within foreign families.

The Bonn government will thus have to choose between two evils — and it should do so soon.

Regardless whether Bonn decides to restrict or permit immigration, it will find it easier to explain the decision to the public than to explain doing nothing.

Wolfgang Werner

(Vorwärts, 22 July 1982)

■ BUSINESS

Steel gets state boost to finance investment plans

Germany's steel industry, is to get belated state support so it can finance investment projects.

The steel companies plan about DM15 billion worth of investment projects for the next few years.

Under EEC provisions, investments that begin by 1985 and are completed by 1988 may be subsidised.

Bonn's assistance for the industry is late in coming — but not too late.

The only thing that makes sense of Bonn's decision to go against its own market policy ideology is the fact that the rest of the European steel industry has for years been heavily subsidised by respective governments.

This has made it "an unequal race", as Dieter Spethmann, chairman of the Iron and Steel Federation, puts it.

According to the federation, the other steel-producing nations of the Community pumped some DM80bn into their ailing steel industries during the seven lean years. This violated both the spirit and the letter of the Coal and Steel Community treaty.

This is why the US Department of Commerce has put special levies on steel imports from the EEC.

The levies vary from company to company, reflecting the different degrees of subsidising.

The products of the major European steel companies pay the following levies on their free on board prices: British *Steel 40 per cent, Sacilor 30 per cent, Cokkerill-Sambre* 20 per cent, Usinor 20 per cent and Italsider 18 per cent.

The Germans pay much less: Röchling Burbach 8.6 per cent and Peine Salzgitter 3.6 per cent. The others pay less than 1 per cent.

There is thus a distinct gradient regarding steel subsidies within the Community. And Bonn's future subsidies will not markedly change this situation.

Even if the DM15 billion in investment projects were to be subsidised at the rate of 30 per cent the total assistance to Germany's steel industry would be only DM4.5bn — a fraction of what the British, French and Italian steel makers have been getting. But the final subsidy sum in Germany is likely to be even lower than the assumed DM4.5bn.

The Bonn Economic Affairs Ministry had originally figured on a maximum of DM6bn worth of investments by the steel industry. But the investment amounts that have now been reported by the various companies include DM4.8bn for Thyssen; DM4.6bn for the Ruhrstahl partners Hoesch and Krupp Stahl; DM1.8bn for the Klöckner Works; and DM1.6bn for Peine-Salzgitter.

The only big company not to have reported any investment projects was Mannesmann.

It is obvious that not all these figures must be taken at face value. Many companies reported larger investment plans than they actually envisage in order to test Bonn's generosity.

Bonn and state government officials should carefully check the reported investment plans before giving their final approval.

When it comes to actually paying the subsidies, Bonn is likely to be more tight-fisted than the industry would like.

According to the steel subsidy law, steel makers may (under certain circumstances) claim 10 per cent of the investment amount as a tax-free investment subsidy.

In some cases, this can be raised to as much as *30* per cent. But this would presuppose that Bonn and the federal state concerned grant an additional 20 per cent as a conditionally repayable subsidy at the ratio of two to one.

Thyssen, Hoesch and Krupp Stahl (the latter two on behalf of the future Ruhrstahl AG) have applies for a 30 per cent subsidy while Klöckner has let it go at 10 per cent.

But Klöckner hopes to get another DM120m from the Steel Research Fund.

Since the various types of assistance — subsidies, regional promotion, research assistance and social security,

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'We should give it a tow.'

(Cartoon: Hanel/Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger)

Struggling AEG gets some help but it's strictly limited

The Bonn government has evidently taken to heart the accusation that it is using the taxpayer's money to act as a repair shop for bankrupt private corporations.

Its decision to lend a helping hand to the ailing electrical giant AEG-Telefunken by providing export guarantees has been limited to DM600 million.

This will give AEG a bit of breathing space but it will not put it back on its feet.

And even the export guarantees were given conditionally and are contingent on the commercial banks' willingness to grant an additional loan of DM275 million. (The banks have now agreed).

The suggestion that equities in the AEG subsidiary Telenorma ba used as a collateral for further borrowing or sold has met with resistance from the Bosch company.

So now AEG has to look for other assets it can pledge. In any event, the banks are not prepared to extend further credits without collateral.

But even should all conditions for Bonn's export guarantees be met, AEG's liquidity cushion would only extend to the end of the year when a final rehabilitation concept will have to be worked out.

Nobody knows as yet how such a concept would look, and there is no guarantee whatsoever that Bonn would support any concept with further guarantees.

In any event, an application to Bonn for a DM1 billion guarantee is likely to be shelved. But the evaluation of auditors appointed by the government is still pending.

Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff has told the press that Bonn does not intend to replace what should be a purely private rehabilitation move by a government rescue action.

The government also does not intend to put forward a rehabilitation concept of its own that would directly or indirectly involve the state.

Lambsdorff and Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein are no longer prepared to make the taxpayer pay for past mistakes made jointly by the management and the trade unions.

In the case of AEG, the resistance that has been put up by the metalworkers union, IG Metall, against the participation of a British firm is unlikely to help solve the problem.

It is therefore no coincidence that Lambsdorff has called on AEG staff members and the union representatives on the company's supervisory board to do everything they can to enable the electrical giant to introduce structural changes.

He has also called on the board, the company's top executives and the staff to be prepared to make financial sacrifices.

Time is of the essence. The longer it takes permanently to put the concern back on its feet, the greater the danger of AEG losing market shares.

Trade union officials should also know that a rehabilitation of the concern — with or without British participation — can only be achieved by shutting down unprofitable sectors of the operation.


There are also those who say that an honest bankruptcy could secure more jobs than a continued tug-of-war.

In any event, it remains to be seen whether AEG will live long enough to celebrate its 100th anniversary next year.

Hans-Henning Zencke

(Bremer Nachrichten, 15 July 1982)





Bonn decides to chop Berlin air fare subsidy

The Bonn government has decided to end its subsidy on air travel to West Berlin. The subsidy costs the West German taxpayer DM98 million a year. This means that tickets on flights to West Berlin can be sold at about 18 per cent less than the economic price. The intention is to reduce the subsidy next year by DM25 million and cut it out entirely by 1986.

The German airline, Lufthansa, does not fly to West Berlin, so the subsidy means extra business only for the airlines of the three western powers that do, British Airways, Air France and Pan Am.

Not surprisingly ambassadors of the Western powers have protested.

The suspicion lingers that some of the Allied airlines have for years been using their Berlin flights to offset deficits on other European routes. It was therefore almost a national duty for the ambassadors to protest.

By the same token, it is understandable that Bonn's reaction to the intervention was rather cool.

The airlines have been raising their fares continuously and have more than once irritated the Bonn government by not entirely laying bare their books.

Of course, the issue of air traffic to and from Berlin is much too delicate for anybody to get much joy out of such a diplomatic tug-of-war.

The Bonn Finance Minister is not all wrong when saying that the subsidies would eventually have amounted to only 10 per cent of the ticket price and would therefore have been no incentive to go to Berlin.

Travel to Berlin is in any event much more endangered by the lack of competition among the Western airlines and the GDR dumping policy at East Berlin's Schönefeld airport than by the elimination of Bonn's subsidies.

If West Berlin's political parties really consider the subsidies essential for the viability of the city they should put forward convincing proposals for their financing.

"It would be no problem at all for experts to find one hundred million surplus deutschemarks that are floating around in the Berlin Promotion Law (that is now in the process of being amended and that is meant to benefit the Berlin economy).

An SPD member of the Bundestag for Berlin recently made proposals on saving DM100m by postponing the construction of cyclists' paths in Berlin.

Such a "sacrifice" on the part of the city could convince even the Bonn government and make it not only retain the flight subsidies but even increase them.

Only if this were done would Berlin be worth a trip in the long run.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 July 1982)

■ FINANCE

Ill-founded rumours cause hysteria and give the banks a hard week

It was a hellish week for Germany's bankers. First, there were rumours that Hessische Landesbank (Helaba) was in trouble in London and that its London representative had been fired.

Half a billion deutschemark was said to have been hastily transferred from Germany to London to plug a dangerous hole.

The same afternoon, there were rumours that in one German city there was a run on the bank für Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG).

That evening, *dpa* tried to verify a news item to the effect that the police had searched the home of Dresdner Bank chairman Hans Friderichs.

As early as Tuesday that week there was a flurry of phone calls to the Dresdner Bank from people who wanted to know whether it was true that Friderichs had resigned in connection with the problems the electrical firm AEG was facing.

The same week newspapers reported that a major German bank was in trouble over foreign exchange deals.

All these reports were unfounded. Behind the Helaba rumour there was no more than the fact that one board member had to break off his vacation to return to attend a conference on AEG.

The BfG story was pure fabrication.

It is true that the home of Hans Friderichs was searched in connection with the Flick donations affair (the donations allegedly went to various of the major political parties through a number of devious channels).

But this has nothing to do with the Dresdner Bank, and Friderichs has never as much as contemplated resigning.

The reports about a major German bank being in trouble (variously referring to Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank, Dresdner Bank and BfG) could only be wrong because German banks cannot get into "trouble" due to the safeguards following the collapse of the Herstatt bank in Cologne.

Even so, there was a great deal of unrest. Many people were determined to pick up their savings because they feared that they would lose their money as people did in 1931 and as many a Herstatt customer did in 1974.

Those familiar with the German national character know that nothing can cause as much hysteria as anxiety over money.

The people still remember the inflations of 1923 and 1948 and the bank crisis of 1931. Each time, lifetime savings were lost.

But what happend this time? The Bundesbank (central bank) governors decided to take their summer holiday without first taking the foot off the monetary brake.

The idea was that the Bundesbank would intervene at a moment's notice — but only if the commercial banks suddenly needed additional cash.

This happened, and the Bundesbank promptly boosted the commercial banks' liquidity by DM5bn. They used foreign exchange swop deals in which the Bundesbank buys dollars from the commercial banks, selling them back to them at a fixed later date and at a fixed rate of exchange. Foreign exchange dealers got the wrong notion that this was being done because some bank was in trouble and the Bundesbank wanted to lend a helping hand.

And when foreign exchange dealers believe in such a rumour it soon spreads to dealers abroad.

It took only a few hours for the "news" that German and Canadian banks were broke to spread world-wide.

American banks like to use such rumours to distract attention from their problems at home: two smallish American banks have collapsed.

The American bankers then telephoned their German partners, telling them that they would have to review their lines of credit.

This sort of thing, of course, causes further uncertainty among bankers on this side of the Atlantic.

The hysteria fed on itself and spread. Huge blocks of stock and fixed interest securities were suddenly thrown on the market.

Though it was untrue that, as some papers wrote, foreign banks had withdrawn some of their deposits from German banks, it is correct that some timid investors fled from the deutschemark into the dollar, causing the American currency to rise steeply (to DM2.51).

Outside observers must be forgiven for having swallowed all these rumours because, for someone who doesn't know all the details, the accumulation of facts is enough to make the layman cringe.

For example: AEG Telefunken needs a cash injection to survive. Banks and the Bonn government (the former through credits and the latter through an export guarantee) have at least ensured that the payroll for the next few months can be met.

But only the weeks still ahead will show whether the concern can continue — be it with German or with foreign partners. And everybody instantly associates AEG with Dresdner Bank, its largest creditor. And, naturally, everybody also thinks of Friderichs, the bank's chairman.

In addition, the trade union owned Neue Heimat group, that has been the subject of the scandal involving its board members, needs DM350m to cover its debts. This has naturally involved the BfG (also owned by the trade unions) in the rumours, although the bank's cash position is so good as to have made it unnecessary for it to make use of Bundesbank facilities (by borrowing against securities as a collateral).

The third and much more important element is the risky credits that German banks have extended to Poland. Here, the BfG is in the forefront while Dresdner Bank ranks fourth.

Only this explains — without justifying it — why the rumours seized on these two banks and their credits.

Foreign observers saw these facts as part of a shaky political constellation: the Bonn coalition partners who have been at loggerheads for some time have only seemingly solved their budgetary woes. Rainer Barzel once said: "There's something wrong with this country." And this is how many timid foreigners probably see the Federal Republic right now.

But does this mean that the Germans should panic, that they should withdraw their savings from the banks and put them under the mattress? There is not the slightest reason to do so. Several lessons have been learned from the collapse of the Herstatt Bank:

One: Since 1976, the deposits of private individuals, companies and public institutions have been as secure with private banks as with savings banks, cooperative banks and similar institutions.

To enjoy this security, however, no individual deposit may exceed *30 per* cent of the bank's own assets.

Inge Lore Bähre, president of the Banks Supervision Board: "We have the world's best safeguards for deposits."

Two: Gambling in foreign exchange and precious metals is out of the question. The difference between the banks' and savings banks' foreign exchange, gold, silver and platinum asset and liability positions may never exceed 30 per cent of the banks' liable capital at the end of a business day.

Three: The orderly winding up of a bank that is insolvent has been possible since 1976 as a result of a decree providing for a moratorium on commitments. Confidence crises that could spread like wildfire are therefore impossible now.

Four: Credits to a single customer may not exceed 75 per cent (formerly 100 per cent) of the bank's liable capital. This means that, unlike in 1931, a bank can no longer lose all its capital as a result of the insolvency of a single customer.

All these safeguards make a repeat of the 1931 bank crisis impossible. Moreover, according to a Bundesbank analysis, the cash position of German banks is excellent.

Today's dangers lurk elsewhere: on the Euromarkets. Assuming a group of banks in Luxembourg gives Mexico a 10-year credit. The money lent for this long term is borrowed against 3-month notes have to repaid and borrowed again every three months.

The nightmare here is: What if the renewal loan fails to materialise?

But since all of the world's banks have the same nightmare, the Euromarkets have so far posed no real danger.

But other risks — like high foreign debts of individual countries like Poland, wars like that between Britain and Argentina and political upheavals as in Iran — have made the bankers extremely cautious.

Rudolf Herlt

(Die Welt, 16 July 1982)

Schmude and Baum

Continued from page 4

reconciliation between the coalition partners in the past couple of weeks, despite the fact (as Schmude puts it) that "the elephants that were stomping around in the garden were pretty hefty beasts."

In any event, the idea that people of Spranger's and Barschel's ilk could "take over out political functions keeps both of us on out toes," says Schmude.

In fact, keeping on their toes and loyally sticking to the Social-Liberal coalition while others are asleep is the watchword of the two ministers.

The question is: Why has the Social-Liberal coalition always publicly played down the results of the Baum-Schmude cooperation — results anybody could be proud of — while regaling the public daily with their constant disputes?

Jürgen Schmude, who frequently spends until midnight in his office poring over files, ponders the question before answering: "The problems we deal with don't affect the pay envelope or pensions. We also have nothing to do with missiles that we can deploy or dismantle."

"Gerhart Baum, who is more optimistic by nature, is fortified by the knowledge that there is a man "who thinks and acts like Jürgen Schmude."

Both hope that their sound and successful partnership will continue for quite a while to come.

Karl-Heinz Krumm

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 July 1982)

Continued from page 6

provisions — can be handled as cumulative, the subsidies can in some cases amount to as much as 50 per cent. In any event, this is what Hoesch and Krupp Stahl have in writing from Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff.

In addition, the two Ruhrstahl partners have applied for starting assistance in the form of government guarantees to the tune of DM2bn. This is to be modelled on Röchling Burbach, which was saved from collapse by a combination of guarantees and subsidies.

Among the many conditions on which the public sector makes its subsidies contingent is the reduction of production capacities.

Thyssen will reduce its steel pipes production by about 15 per cent, i.e. from 21m to 18m tons a year (including stainless steel); Klöckner will reduce production by 18 per cent from 8.2 to 6.6m tons. Its rolling mill capacity is to be reduced at the same rate from 11.5m to 9.5 tons. Ruhrstahl will reduce its output by 31 per cent from 15.6m to 10.8m tons.

Brussels is bound to insist on this capacity reduction. The EEC objective is for Europe's steel industry to reduce its overall capacity by 20 per cent by 1985 because steel consumption is likely to stagnate until then. Incidentally, it is until 1985 that the EEC steel market provisions with their production quotas will remain in force.

What matters, therefore, is to make steel production more profitable.

It is no coincidence that only Ruhrstahl proposes to build a new steel mill and Saarhütten a new blast furnace. Both are replacement investments.

All other investment plans are intended for rationalisation and modernisation — especially in the sheetmetal sector.

Although this has not been expressly admitted, the aim for the future is to operate as profitably as Thyssen is doing now; and this means making a profit with crude steel even when the plant operates at only 50 per cent of capacity.

This is an ambitious goal and Bonn or state politicians can achieve nothing without the go-ahead from the Brussels Commission. And the Commission will have to make up its mind by mid-1938.

Norbert Welter

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 16 July 1982)

■ WEALTH

Plans afoot to close the tax loopholes that help the rich get richer

German social welfare benefits have been cut back. But Chancellor Schmidt says that the rich are going to be hit as well.

He was referring to tax. "A number of people will forfeit their marvellous opportunities of saving virtually all their income tax," the Chancellor promised.

The Minister of Finance in North-Rhine Westphalia, Dieter Posser, had already criticised those "who earn a million or more and yet still receive state grants for the education of their children because they arithmetically on paper make a loss, despite their huge incomes".

The fact that millionaires can rake in the benefits of (other) taxpayers' money is an unhealthy product of the government's subsidisation policies.

And yet both the national government and the governments of the individual states still stick to these policies year after year.

Whether they try to stimulate a better performance in certain sectors of the economy and protect them from distorted competition; or whether they try to cheapen goods and services for private households to boost the propensity to save.

Nothing seems to work without government subsidisation.

> **One dentist . . . received a loss certificate of 230 per cent . . . he had to pay DM2,770 tax on an income of DM250,000. He saved DM109,920.**

For this purpose the proud figure of DM30 billion is earmarked in this year's budget, half in the form of monetary contributions, half in the form of tax concessions.

Ever since the Federal government's resources started drying up, it has been giving serious thought to drastically cutting back government subsidies.

Similar operations in 1981 and 1982 aimed at bringing down the government budget led to a reduction in subsidisation, for example in the field of savings promotion.

The 1983 operation has its sights set on tax concessions, which are definitely unjustified.

The case of the millionaire who officially earns nothing whatsoever, pays no taxes and receives a state grant for his children is of course an extreme one.

However, as Finance Minister Posser found out when he inquired at the various finance offices in North-Rhine Westphalia, there are many cases of top earners saving DM500,000.

Take for example the case of a 44-year-old businessman, married, no children, whose taxable income in 1979 amounted to DM4,600,989.

Officially this businessman would have had to pay DM2,435,592 in tax. He actually paid DM1,866,945, saving DM568,647.

He managed this by presenting the finance offices with loss certificates of more than DM1 million issued by companies in which he had an investment share.

The finance office responsible in Es-



sen accepted the validity of these certificates.

The loss certificate is in a way the opposite of a dividend. If the company in which the potential taxpayer holds shares makes a loss instead of a profit, the losses are subsequently distributed.

All company shareholders receive a loss certificate which can then be offset against the rest of their income.

This loss certificate is entered into the accounts as if it were operating expenditure, thus reducing the taxable income.

The reverse is the case if profits are distributed. Although the original intention of encouraging certain branches of industry had its good points, many legal stipulations have brought about unwanted side-effects.

They may well go towards enhancing the investment capacity of numerous firms, but in many cases they had effects which were not planned by the legislator.

They encouraged asset formation for top earners.

High-income doctors, lawyers and other free-lance operators, whose income had reached the highest tax progression level of 56 per cent, searched for *ways of getting around their tax obligations.*

And as is often the case there are always those willing to lend a helping hand, in this case the promoters of depreciation companies. Suddenly, top earners began investing their money in share certificates from firms dealing in everything ranging from ship-building, film production, housebuilding to promoting economic activities in Berlin and the border areas near East Germany.

The only thing such 'investors' are interested in are the loss certificates. It just doesn't matter whether the company makes pornographic films or artistic ones.

The only things that counts is the extent of the losses made. The higher the loss, the lower the amount of taxable income and thus of taxes.

It certainly pays off to jump down a few categories in the tax classification scheme.

One dentist, who had an investment share of DM100,000 in a company which provided him with a loss certificate to the tune of 230 per cent, only had to pay DM2,770 in tax on an income of DM250,000. He saved DM109,920!

As soon as loss-making becomes the maxim for professional depreciation tricksters, it doesn't take long before fraudulent firms begin sprouting up.

The tax laws make this possible in the first place. A district court in Darmstadt was recently faced with a clear case of fraud.

Finance broker, Joohim Erlemann from Cologne, managed to convince finance offices of his severe losses and sent loss certificates to his investors robbing the Treasury of about DM50 million.

The judge in this case took the opportunity to level his criticism of such practices at the legislator, which shares at least some of the moral blame.

He condemned the legal loopholes in existing laws, which enable top earners to save vast amounts of money while the lower-income members of society are denied such possibilities.

Some moves have already been made to make things a bit more difficult for the high-income bracket. Tax-deductable losses must not exceed the actual sum of money invested.

However, necessity is the mother of invention, an clever tax experts will always find new loopholes, opening the door to new ways of saving tax 'legally'.

The SPD tax expert, Dieter Spöri, a bitter opponent of unjustified tax savings, complains: "The problem is we just can't keep up with the pace of new developments on the investments market."

Tax laws, for example, allow concealed assets a tax-favoured realisation when a company is sold. The idea is to save the retiring owner of the firm from moving into the top tax bracket.

In addition, there are considerable free allowances in case of sale. Clever company promoters have combined this arrangement with another tax stipulation, which enables the acquisition costs of low-value goods (up to DM800 per item) to be fully written off during the year of purchase and then offset against any profits yielded.

For example, anyone who sets up a chicken farm can write off each individual chicken as an economic item, not to mention the hen-house and the chicken ladder.

The value of the farm suddenly drops to zero and the accounts very soon in fact register a loss. If this farm is then sold after the year is up, the profits made are tax-favoured.

Finance Minister Posser would at least like to put an end to such practices. Another way of saving tax is provided for by the law promoting German investments abroad. Normally, the economy as a whole benefits if German industry sets up production in a foreign country. However, investments by German entrepreneurs in American entertainment films, such as 'Star Wars' are not exactly what the law had in mind.

It is of no benefit to the German eco-

> **A finance broker convinced the finance office of severe losses and sent loss certificates to his investors, robbing the Treasury of about DM50 million.**

nomy if high-income free-lance German investors participate in the flourishing real estate trade in Miami just to avoid paying taxes back home.

The up to now most successful companies, with shares in the most unsuccessful cattle farms in Paraguay, in fact bring about extremely detrimental developmental effects: the poorer sections of the agricultural community now stand no chance whatsoever of becoming the owners of a piece of land.

The respective German legal provisions are also now up for discussion. Chancellor Schmidt would also like to remove one of the most popular methods of asset formation: the *Bauherrenmodell*, builder-owner companies.

Federal Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein has been asked to look for ways of preventing unjustified benefits accruing to such companies. Let's take for example, the case of the chalet in Switzerland costing DM450,000, which can be bought with a capital contribution by the interested purchaser of only DM3,500, providing the buyer has a taxable annual income of at least DM300,000.

To buy the chalet the German purchaser must provide his own capital contribution of 10 per cent, i. e. in this case DM45,000.

The tax benefits of the *Bauherrenmodell* grant a loss certificate worth DM74,000, which reduces the income debt by DM41,500.

If this sum of money is set off against the DM45,000 invested, the ten per cent participation in the DM450,000 chalet costs no more than DM3,500.

The trick shown here is relatively simple, although the details are mastered by only a few old-hands. In principle, the idea is to shift the manufacturing costs in such a way as to turn them into professional expenses during the building stage, which can then be written of in the year of acquisition.

> **An example of how the *Bauherrenmodell* works: loss certificates mean that in the case of a mountain chalet costing DM450,000, a 10 per cent deposit can be bought for only DM3,500.**

Very often these models are drawn up so as to incur high agency fees, involving many firms, each of which calculates its own costs.

In reality, however, there is very often only one company behind the operation.

The *Bauherrenmodell* has its particular appeal in the fact that a double deal is involved.

After the investor has pushed through his tax benefits, he can sell his property as soon as the two-year speculation limit has run out.

In view of the rising building and property prices, a handsome profit is to be expected by selling anew. The builder-owners have stated that in this year alone DM16bn have been subscribed to such models. And there's no end in sight. Advertising for the *Bauherrenmodell* is in full flight.

Recently, the WEWO GmbH in Munich offered investors 500 per cent loss certificates for companies in Berlin. The very favorable tax conditions for Berlin can be explained by the fact that capital investments in Berlin are particularly encouraged by tax concessions.

Taxpayers who invest in Berlin are always in for favourable treatment by the Treasury. An offer made by the *Allianz* life insurance company underlines just how favorable this treatment is. Top earners with a 50 per cent rate of taxation can enjoy the benefits of a particularly attractive life insurance arrangement.

The lion's share of the dividend for the DM56,000 insurance, that is DM20,000, is immediately payable. However, this is no problem for the insured person himself, but one for the Treasury hooked by the Berlin Promotion Law.

The latter must do without the income tax due during the third and fourth quarters of the year. According to the *Allianz* model, this amounts to DM20,000.

Wolfgang Hoffmann

(Die Zeit, 16 July 1982)

■ AGREEMENTS

Sea law pact still wallowing in uncharted waters

The United States is still not willing to sign the new version of the Law of the Sea convention.

Germany's position was first outlined formally by a government statement issued during parliamentary question time in the *Bundestag* in June.

The negotiations by experts at the UN Law of the Sea Conference were completed at the end of April in New York following nine years of negotiating.

However, a new arrangement for the distribution of seabed rights, which in particular the USA and Germany had tried to achieve, did not come into being.

This was why the USA already voted against passing the text of the conference at the end of April, whereas Germany abstained.

One hundred and 30 countries voted to confirm to result of the conference, among them France and Japan.

With an eye on the Falkland crisis Britain also abstained. Germany's stance over the conference is of vital importance to its final outcome.

A convention which is not accepted by the United States and many member countries of the European Community is not likely to break fresh ground in maritime law, even if it is indeed ratified by the necessary 60 countries.

Should the convention officially take effect under such circumstances, the result would be an even greater degree of legal uncertainty.

Such a situation would not be expected to last long, and it would then be a matter of time before renogotiations are resumed. The German government emphasises that it has not yet completed the process of developing an informed opinion with regard to the convention.

Yet the clear and concise answers being given to individual aspects present a different picture.

For example, the provisions on technology transfer are claimed to stand in the way of effective seabed mining.

According to the German government the planned levies for seabed mining enterprises are excessively high; due to the special peculiarities of German tax law, this is particularly serious for German firms.

The regulations relating to the classification of economic zones leave a great deal to be desired. Furthermore, the degree of German participation in the organs responsible for implementing the convention does not come up to initial expectations.

Finally serious problems may arise as a result of the fact that in future a review conference is to decide on the continuation of the seabed set-up just by a requisite majority, the decision affecting all countries. The Germans were also disappointed about the course of negotiations on investment protection for seabed mining enterprises.

Only the Soviet Union, France, Japan and India were granted the status of pioneer investor countries. A German firm (AMR) can only begin activities as a member of an international consortium (OMI), which due to the varied interests represented is not likely to be able to provide a guarantee for continual work.

Only a few months ago after considerable diplomatic activities the German government managed to get permission to set up the planned International Court of Sea Law in Humburg.

This would suggest that at that time Germany harboured a better opinion of the conference results.

At present, however, support would seem to be on the wane. In the final analysis though it is quite possible that after weighing up the pros and cons Germany may come to a more positive appraisal.

This depends on the appeal of regulations in the following fields: the settlement of disputes, the planned agreement on passage through straits, regulations on shipping and on environmental protection and the guaranteeing of military mobility at sea.


Admittedly, even in these areas there are differences of opinion. The German government is not a great supporter of the planned extension of the rights of coastal states.

Another line of argument is that there is not likely to be much opportunity in the near future for new negotiations, implying that the only way Germany can really influence the implementation of the convention is by supporting it officially.

Such arguments would seem farfetched in the light of the statements which have been made recently by the German government and the fact that the most powerful Western maritime power refuses to sign the convention.

Dr Dolzer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 12 July 1982)



(Cartoon: Murschetz/Die Zeit)

No highway for European air traffic control plan

Air traffic control in Europe looks set to revert to individual countries. Eurocontrol, the European air safety system, was organised 22 years ago, but has not actually got off the ground.

Only Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany followed the terms of the initial contract and transferred control to the organisation.

The rest of the seven member countries decided in 1980 that no further efforts to enforce Eurocontrol would be made after February next year.

After that date, Eurocontrol will still exist, but it will responsible for planning and testing air safety systems, coordinating traffic flow on the heaviest routes, training flight controllers and technicians and collecting route charges from the airlines.

By dropping rights to direct control from the control tower, the organisation managed to prevent Britain and France from ending the seven-nation agreement altogether.

The German government had always regretted the rejection by its partners, particularly since it was one of the energetic countries at the start, willing to make many sacrifices.

It had done without the administrative centre and the technical research institute of the organisation and accepted the setting-up of an air safety system in Germany itself, just like the Netherlands and Ireland before.

The future of the two control centres in Karlsruhe and Maastricht, which control aircraft in air space above 7,500 metres coming from Britain and Scandinavia and flying towards the Balkan states and the Mediterranean, is at stake.

Maastricht must limit its activities to areas above Belgium, Luxembourg and northern Germany, since the Netherlands have not yet been willing to hand over any responsibility for its air safety.

The essential part of the task area of the control centre in the Netherlands is thus lacking.

In order to find a way of guaranteeing some kind of future for the control centre in Maastricht, Eurocontrol, commissioned by Germany and the Benelux countries, has developed four concepts relating to the continuation and possible extension of its activities.

The European flight controllers in Brussels would like to see Maastricht take over flight safety control in the lower regions of air space, leaving only arrivals and departures under national control.

The Hague also prefers this solution, and would then be willing to transfer control responsibilities to Maastricht.

The suggestion to integrate arrival flight control into the Maastricht Automatic Data Processing and Display System (MADAP), which is taken to be one of the best systems in the world, does not stand much chance of acceptance.

Other proposals would like to see the present system maintained, shifting only the borderlines between the upper and lower ranges of air space.

Each concept has different implications about the number of flight controllers required and the technology to be used.

The costs of each concept thus vary. The German government is trying to make another model palatable to its partners.

It would like to transfer the tasks performed in Maastricht to control centres in Bremen, Düsseldorf and Brussels, which would imply a dissolution of the Eurocontrol setup.

So as to prevent this from happening, Maastricht sould in future control Europe's flow of air traffic and assume flight consultation responsibilities.

The whole thing is an attempt to achieve better coordination between the inadequate ait safety capacity in Mediterranean countries and the huge amount of air traffic during the summer months.

For Bonn the setting-up of a flight plan coordinator and an air space control centre such as the one in Frankfurt are examples of how this could work in practice.

The latter already goes towards alleviating the situation for German air traffic.

Bottlenecks in space and in time can be prevented by planning the use of air space months in advance and working out flight plans as early as possible.

Maastricht has, according to Bonn, the necessary technical equipment. In a joint report the four governments have in the mean time expressdd their views on the Eurocontrol proposals.

Their attention centres on personnel costs, which account for a substantial share of the operational costs and which have an important part to play due to the differences in pay between the Eurocontrol flight controllers and those employed on a national basis.

The investment costs, on the other hand, are neglected, even though Belgium alone would have to build a control centre costing more than DM100m, if the countries involved decide on a solution other than the one first mentioned.

The fate of the Eurocontrol centre in Karlsruhe is closely linked to that of Maastricht.

Only if Maastricht continues operations under European control is there a chance for Karlsruhe. Otherwise, the German Federal Institute for Air Safety will step in and take over responsibility.

Personnel from this institute are have already been commissioned by this Eurocontrol to carry out flight safety tasks.

By the time the final date arrives on 1 March 1983 all responsibility will be handed over to the centre in Frankfurt.

Eurocontrol without its own centre would, according to experts, turn into "an expensive and worthless paper tiger" which would be of little advantage to its users, both the airlines and thus the passengers, yet leave a large bill to be paid.

Rudolf Metzler

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 July 1982)

■ RESEARCH

Weather men go to the Alps to unlock secrets of the weather

Up until 30 September all eyes of professional meteorologists are on the Alps.

Ever since 1 September last year the Alpine Experiment, Alpex for short, has been at the centre of the Global Atmopsheric Research Programme by the World Meteorological Organisation in Geneva.

The countries bordering the Alps plus Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland have been taking part.

The USA and the Soviet Union have allowed their weather ships in the east Atlantic to be used for research.

The primary objective behind this extensive project is to investigate the dynamic-physical phenomena associated with the flow of air around and above high mountain ranges.

Just how important the influence of the Alps on the atmosphere is rated by experts is underlined by the extent of operations.

The area covered stretches from south Scandinavia to the coast of Africa, from the Eastern part of the North Atlantic to the Baltic Sea and down to Western Turkey.

The main beneficiaries of research results will be European scientists, for example in their weather forecasting.

But results are also expected to apply to other massifs, such as the Rocky Mountains in North America.

The Alps were chosen because the permanent observation network in Europe is relatively compact and a whole series of observations have already been collected and evaluated.

Yet even the meteorological network in the Alpine region is still not in a position to measure the many changes in air masses numerically and analyse them accordingly.

Numerical forecasts using computers require a great deal more data gathered in a closely-woven atmospheric network.

Otherwise, many of the more local weather phenomena cannot be recorded.

To help improve the situation, aircraft, ships and buoys (in the Mediterranean and the East Atlantic), radiosonde stations, weather balloons, radar and radiation tracking stations, motor gliders and of course, weather satellites for vertical atmosphere observation are being employed, closing the gas in the observation network.

Experiments are not just aimed at acquiring data on the effects of weather on a large scale, but also at explaining certin occurences in smaller areas, for example the foehn storms in the Alpine valleys. The toughest task for meteorologists is tackling the details.

The emergence of foehn storms still remains a mystery.

Meteorologists are puzzled by the fact that the warmer air, i.e. the lighter of the two currents, descends when it reaches the lee side of the mountain ridge.

How does it push out the colder, heavier air in the valleys?

Why doesn't it just flow over the cold air in the foothills region of the Alps and make it way northward?

Experts agree that foehn is caused amongst other things by the speed of flow and the resultant "thrust tension" of the air masses on the mountain ridge.

However, both the strength and the duration of these fall winds are dificult to predict.

A further unsolved problem is the medical-meteorological aspect, the effects of the foehn on human beings. It is precisely to find this out that the foehn is being exactly measured in so-called "cross-sections", vertical areas in the atmosphere at a height of between three and five kilometres.

They have been plotted right across the St. Gotthard and Brenner passes, down to the Adriatic coastal ranges and the Yugoslavian mediterranean coast.

Both ground stations and the motorised gliders flying along the points of intersection are equipped with microbarographs, which can detect atmopsheric vibrations of high frequency and low amplitude.

Scientists believe that some of the physiological effects of the foehn can be put back to such oscillations. Another unsolved mystery in Alpine meteorology are the so-called Genoa cyclones.

The emergence of low pressure areas in the Gulf of Lion are apparently connected to the lee affects induced during air flows over the Alpine ridges.

These powerful low pressure areas often bring about storm tides during their journey south across the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea. The sea near Genoa is rougher than the German Bight.

These cyclones, however, also affect areas north of the Alps, often leading to very heavy rain and snow in Bavaria. West Germany is particularly involved in Alpex.

The *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG) helps finance individual programmes.

The German Met Office has increased its use of radiosondes in southern Germany, offering its services for further measurement activities.

The Marine Weather Centre in Hamburg is busy gathering information from the various sea-borne observation points in the East Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The German Research and Experimental Centre for Aeronautical and Space Travel, for example, has provided a research aircraft and three motorised gliders.

The meteorological institutes of the various universities are also involved in special research projects in the context of the Alpex programme, backed financially by the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*.

Heinz Panzram

(Die Welt, 10 July 1982)

■ THE CINEMA

Fassbinder's last role: film assured of success

Wolf Gremm's film *Kamikaze 1989* cannot fail to be a success: Rainer Werner Fassbinder is dead but here he comes to life once more, jaded, alcoholic, running amok, melancholy, lonely and insulting to those who are close to him.

In the end, he (as Police Lieutenant Jansen) leans against an outsized poster depicting the first man on the moon.

Fassbinder just stands there, smiling ironically into the camera while the film ends with him becoming a rigid statue. This is how the viewer sees him for a while as the curtain slowly descends.

The film is a first-class cinematic event. Its director will have to come to terms with the fact that this has little to do with his ability.

He hired Fassbinder, his collegue, as the lead, which is undeniably to his credit.

But nobody knew then that Fassbinder would soon be dead. *Kamikaze 1989* has now become an epitaph.

It would have been impossible for Gremm to have started something with a man like Fassbinder without the product turning into a tribute to the late director.

Nobody doubts Gremm's statement in interviews to the effect that Fassbinder was prepared to subjugate himself to the director and that he accepted the fact that he was an actor in the film rather than its maker.

Gremm, whose intention was to make a film with Fassbinder, could not help also wanting to make a film à la Fassbinder.

But no matter how exaggerated and daringly Fassbinder the director staged his films, the story he wanted to convey always came out clear, understandable and at times resembling a woodcut.

Born in 1942, Gremm has so far failed to impress with such films as *Fabian* or *Kein Reihenhaus für Robin Hood* (no terrace house for Robin Hood). But now, he has turned a crime story with a deeper meaning into a chaotic punk film.

Lieutenant Jansen has a difficult case on his hands: there is a bomb threat in the skyscraper office building of a mammoth media concern.

Thousands of employees have to be evacuated; and though no bomb explodes, the men in the executive suites become jittery. They're bothered by Jansen's inquiries, so they obstruct his work.

Ministry involved

The case must be closed — no matter how — and nothing more must be said about it because it appears that even the Ministry of the Interior is involved.

Jansen is determined to get to the bottom of it all. He makes an important discovery: the allegedly 30-storey building has a 31st floor to which there is neither an elevator nor stairs.

The film is based on the novel *Mord im 31. Stock* (Murder on the 31st Floor) by the Swedish author Per Wahlöö.

He wrote the book in the 1960s, before his successful collaboration with his

Frankfurter Allgemeine

wife Maj Sjöwall, with whom he wrote a 10-volume cycle of crime novels that is regarded as the best of the genre.

His book, *Mord im 31 Stock,* is a negative utopia: a concern controls the newspapers and magazines of the country, buys up competing publishing houses and, on the 31st floor, intellectual elite of the nation wastes its energy in pointless projects that will never be published.

In both the novel and the film, the anonymous threat to Jansen is eventually discovered among this isolated intellectual elite.

A second bomb scare occurs and again the skyscraper has to be evacuated — except for the people on the 31st floor, for whom no evacuation provisions have been made.

It remains open whether the bomb that explodes on the 31st floor has been ordered planted by the big boss.

Gremm made a concrete utopia out of the novel that was set in a vague future. The film is set in a Western metropolis in 1989 (it was shot in Düsseldorf and Berlin).

While the book is made up of individual interrogations that reveal the motivations of people, the film version boils down to a hectic chaos. There are unnecessary car crash scenes and murderous chases up and down stairways and corridors.

The novel is a somewhat exaggerated social criticism of a media giant while the film version turns the story into a morbid Wild West romanticism of the most naive kind, projecting the whole thing into the future. It is the story of the lone fighter who, shooting, pushing cars off the road and people of roofs, kills wantonly as if there were nothing to it. It is perfectly understandable that Fassbinder should have enjoyed this spectacle. He had fun playing with the technical possibilities of a video system and holding up a finger to take photos to be used as evidence with a mini camera hidden in a ring.

He kind-heartedly grouched at his assistant (played by Günther Kaufmann, an actor of the Fassbinder stable).

Wearing a leopard skin suit, Fassbinder time and again directs his rages at himself and others. He is the sort of *man who hurts the feelings of others in* order to hide his own vulnerability.

The viewer is enthralled by this man who — perhaps — was not even a particularly good actor. but what a showman; what a master of self-depiction!

Kamikaze 1989 could be quickly forgotten as a film if it were not the inimitable portrait of a maiac.

Fassbinder only played in it, yet it turned out to be his film.

The shortcomings, for which he is not responsible, have to be accepted. The viewer's gain is a last, almost intimate, glance at Fassbinder — one stone in the structure of a legend.

Volker Hage

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 17 July 1982)

Fassbinder says goodbye as Lieutenant Jansen

(Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

Hamburg gives big chance to the small producers

It happens time and again: short, low-budget films are produced without reaching the cinemas because none of the powerful distributors want them.

The last chance for such films is frequently the Hamburg Film Days organised by AG Kino, the federation of German cinemas.

The Hamburg Film Days are not only a festival for cinema goers but also a commercial fair for distributors and cinema owners. The viewers play a major role because the ticket they buy is also a ballot to cast a vote for the films they like.

Hamburg city gives the festival DM120,000.

The last event presented 21 films from nine countries. The emphasis was on new German low-budget films, a number of portraits (of Werner Herzog, Woody Allen and Milos Forman) and English language films, some of which had previously been shown at the Berlin and Cannes festivals.

Several of these films showed a tendency to adopt elements of the classical American detective film.

Der lange Schatten des Morgens (a morning's long shadow) by Raimund

Süddeutsche Zeitung

Koplin and Renate Stegmüller, is an example.

Factory chimneys move past the window of a speeding commuter train to depict the dismal Ruhr area. As library clerk Charlie, having just painted the town red, aimlessly wanders through the deserted street, a corpse drops at his feet.

Later, he falls in love with Antje, whose white-clad-friend is one of the underworld big shots.

Like in the crime novels that line Charlie's bookshelves at home, he unwittingly becomes an extra in a gangster operation.

The action takes place in an environment alternating between brothel, police station, garages and factories. It is plainly the Chicago of the 1930s set in today's Ruhr. In the end, Charlie gets arrested and is released again. There is no moral.

Amos Poe's *Subway Riders* is set in New York rather than the Ruhr. It is the last of his New York trilogy.

By coincidence rather than design, a small group of people meets before the backdrop of night-time bars and subway stations to enact a surrealistic crime story: A recluse saxophone player turns into a mass killer. In the apartment above him lives a whore who habitually dances to phonograph music, dreaming of stardom. A lonely woman drives through night-time streets. A fat, sweating policeman who is after the psychopathic musician argues with a woman drug addict.

Subway Riders is a blend of *film noir* and new wave elements. Next to the obligatory billiard table there is now one of the electronic games machines. The whisky bottle on the window sill has given way to a can of beer. The seamy, bare rooms are depicted in brilliantly cold blue or screaming red. The social disillusionment is shown through glaring, bright, punctuated colours.

The shots in Carl Reiners's film are also familiar: the camera focuses on the papier-mâché metropolis at night — a sight familiar from Hollywood films of the 1940s.

Suddenly there is a (studio) downpour. The mind conjures up a vision of Humphrey Bogart turning up the collar of his trenchcoat and pulling down the brim of his at. You are reminded of scenes in *The Big Sleep.* But this parody of the detective film is entitled *Tote tragen*

Continued on page 12

■ BEHAVIOUR

Social injustice in the legal system, say crime researchers

Young criminals who come from a normal background are less likely to be caught than those from less fortunate backgrounds, says a study by criminologists.

They say the reason is that the police and the legal system look more closely at products of broken homes or institutions.

Children who run away from home are really up against it: they are number one suspects in the system.

These disadvantages, says the report, are seen by the system as a sort of *Lebensführungsschuld*, guilty by lifestyle.

Instead of being taken as a mitigating circumstance, they are regarded as damaging evidence.

The study was by Munich criminologists for the Bonn Department of Youth, Family Affairs and Health.

Vicious circle

The Minister Anke Fuchs, spoke of class justice when she issued the report.

The researchers based their two-year work on Munich police crime statistics from 1971 to 1980.

They also analysed the biographies of juvenile delinquents, interviewed policemen and social workers and scrutinised files.

Though the end product is not representative for the nation as a whole, the researchers nevertheless consider the study is essentially applicable nationally.



Statistics bear out the old experience that most of the recorded repeat criminals among juveniles come from broken homes or had been institutionalised. Unemployed juveniles play a major role.

As with all other types of criminals, here, too, theft accounts for the lion's share of crime.

The researchers say that one surprising element is the fact "multiple conspiciousness" (legal jargon) by no means automatically leads to a "career in crime".

Only five per cent of the sample figure of 23,400 young criminals who offended a second time continued to offend. Most had no further brush with the law. Their crimes were just a passing phase. This supports previous findings.

What is new is the social angle. A control group of juveniles who had committed crimes but who hadn't been caught were compared with a group of convicted recidivists.

The researchers believe they have established that such social drawbacks as broken homes or upbringing in an institution are not the main reasons for juvenile delinquency.

What actually happens is that the police pay particular attention to this group.

But delinquents from a favourable social environment are caught less frequently because the police do not have an eye on them. Since they appear in no records they also escape the law.

The likelihood of being caught is greatest for those who were previously institutionalised, who come from broken homes and whose relations with the parents are particularly strained. Failure at school also is important.

As the study sees it, the result is a vicious circle of crime — punishment — new crime — and tougher punishment.

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 July 1982)

Big chance

Continued from page 11

keine Karos (The Dead don't wear Checks).

Rigby Reardon is the classical private detective who would slit his grandmother's throat for 30 dollars a day plus expenses. He sits behind the desk in his grubby little office. His eyes are fixed on the opaque glass window of the office door on which his name appears in mirror writing.

The shadow of his rich, beautiful client falls on the window. When the door opens, the promise of the seductive glint of the eyes from under the wide brim of the black hat.

After fainting in his arms and being kissed awake by him, Juliet Forret engages Reardon to clear up her father's death. The case is more confusing than *The Big Sleep*, the *Maltese Falcon* and *Casablanca* put together.

The newly shot material is spiked with segments of old Hollywood films; Burt Lancaster opens the door of a seamy boarding house; James Cagney is seen behind prison bars; Ingrid Bergmann, Ava Gardner and Bette Davis put in an appearance as ex-girlfriends.

When Reardon finds himself at the end of his tether, he phones his fellow sleuth, Marlow, when you can see Humphrey Bogart's face under the brim of his hat, mumbling into the phone, a cold cigarette in the corner of his mouth and striking a match on his thumbnail.

But even when Bogey does not appear on the screen, he is still the lead character.

In the end, Reardon and Juliet lie in each other's arms, kissing. And since they are not as good at it as Bogey and Lauren Bacall, the whole thing is extremely funny.

Tote tragen keine Karos was the runaway winner with the audience. And it is no coincidence that this genre is experiencing a renaissance at the moment.

Krischan Koch

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 1982)

Sorry, haven't time to go to work

People would rather fulfil themselves in leisure pursuits than at work according to a survey.

Work is the means of earning a living rather than an end in itself, was the general reaction of the survey, in which the Hamburg-based BAT Leisure Research Institute questioned a cross section of the German working population.

It seems that after-death tributes such as: "He died after a life devoted to his work"; or "All his energy went into building up his company"; or "work and devotion to duty lent meaning to his life"; are likely to become a thing of the past.

If the young generation of today remains as outspoken in old age as it is now, future obituaries could very well read: "He knew how to make the best of his leisure time" or "He lived for leisure" or "He regarded leisure as more important than work".

Work has lost its mythical quality, says Professor Horst Opaschowski, research director of the Institute.

It comes as no surprise that leisure time is more important to the young than to the old, for whom work still represents the greater value.

The scale of values in the BAT study puts work in place number four, after "family and partnership", "leisure time" and "friends and acquaintances".

New ideals have emerged in keeping with this scale of values. The person to be emulated is no longer the hard worker but the "leisure time personality".

Today's sympathy goes to those who know how to make the best possible use of their leisure.

Leisure time, once regarded as no more than a break between working periods, has become a value in its own right or, as Professor Opaschowski puts it, "it has become emancipated."

Fun is for many more important than work performance and possessions.

When asked what sort of values they wish to pass on to their children, young

Frankfurter Allgemeine

parents tend to answer: Less industriousness and devotion to duty and more enjoyment of life, open-mindedness, gaiety and tolerance.

There is a growing desire for social contact that is found more easily in spare time than at work, the study says.

The authors describe leisure time as the "motor behind a change in values" over the past 20 years.

They don't say if the trend will continue.

Dr Hermann Feldgen, head of the Institute, stresses, however, that the change of values could benefit many people.

"Perhaps they will prove a bright spot for the non-workers among us. Pensioners would no longer have to consider themselves as outcasts. Women who, prompted by the general emancipation drive, take a job could well again become housewives only — with a clear conscience."

dpa

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 July 1982)

■ MEDICINE

Daylight saving not always just a simple matter of an extra hour in bed

Daylight saving can upset the rhythm of bodily functions, but the effect should not be dramatised.

Fears that health could be seriously affected are unwarranted, says a team of Dortmund University's Institute for Labour Physiology scientists headed by Professor Joseph Rutenfranz.

They report their findings in an article published in the magazine *Arbeitsmedizin, Sozialmedizin, Präventivmedizin* (6/82).

Usually, the adjustment to the new time takes about two weeks, but in some people it is longer.

Many biological functions change according to the time of day, and the originally spontaneous rhythm often responds to outside influences.

The reactions of the human body to time shifts and the duration of the adjustment period can be established by such indicators as sleep-wakefulness patterns and body temperature.

A survey involving 65 people showed that after the autumn time change, the body temperature increased at 9 a.m. for six days in succession, although the rise normally is not until 10 a.m.

Another survey involving 167 persons in the autumn and 163 in the spring was intended to show the effects of daylight saving time upon waking up on work days. The survey was carried out in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The adjustment of sleeping patterns to the time shown by the clock took considerably longer after the spring change. Some people did not adjust until after a week.

In the autumn, many of the test persons adjusted within only two to three days while the others took five days to adjust.

They tried to adjust to the time change that had been foisted on them by changing their patterns in a bid to get the same amount of sleep.

Almost all of the "test sleepers" went to bed earlier on the first work day after the autumn time shift. But subsequently they went to bed increasingly later than in the week before the shift. The pattern after the spring shift was exactly the opposite.

Another survey, aimed at establishing the quality of sleep by measuring brain impulses with an electroencephalogram (EEC), showed that people had problems falling asleep after the time change.

But this was offset by better quality of sleep and a shorter time to become fully awake in the morning — at least, this is what the EEC showed.

But the subjective feeling did not coincide with the measured results. Most of the people in the test claimed that it took them a week after the spring switch-over to once more get a good night's sleep.

In the autumn, on the other hand, the feeling of having slept well came immediately after the switch-over and even a week later most felt that they had slept better than in the last week of daylight saving time.

One of the more curious findings is that, when asked about the time they took to adjust in general terms, most people said that it was much longer than had been established.

Of the 1 371 interviewees, 30 per cent said it took them more than two months to adjust, 13 per cent spoke of up to two months and 24 per cent said they needed one month. Only 15 per cent said that they adjusted within a week.

Younger people seem to adjust more swiftly than older ones.

Slightly more than half said that they did not go to bed later than usual after the introduction of daylight saving time.

Younger people said they went to bed later. But many complained about frequent tiredness, inability to concentrate and emotional and family problems.

Between 79 and 85 per cent depending on age had none of these problems.

The Dortmund researches also interviewed 169 shift workers and 62 regular workers. Daytime workers had a more positive attitude towards daylight saving time, but everyone appreciated the spare-time advantages of daylight saving.

The shift workers mentioned above all the possibility of more time for their families. The drawbacks, especially for shift workers, were to do with sleep.

Road accidents are influenced by daylight saving.

A comparison made by Dr. Günter Pfaff and Professor Ernst Weber, both of Heidelberg, showed that there more accidents in 1980, when daylight saving time was first introduced than in the previous year. The increase was particularly noticeable in the evening and early night.

According to the magazine *Medical Tribune*, the two researchers attribute say this is because the effects of daylight saving last long after the switchover. Much of this was due to a general change in living habits.

At the end of a working day (which, of course, doesn't get longer or shorter) people do not orientate themselves by the clock but by their subjective feeling of time which is influenced by the longer period of daylight.

People tend to overlook the warning signals of their bodies and become over-tired and hence more accident prone.

The Heidelberg researchers also compared a random sampling of the data of patients treated for accidents at the Heidelberg University Hospital in May 1979 and in May 1980.

The comparison of 1 070 patients resulted in a graph that showed a frequency shift by about one hour — corresponding to the time shift.

Renate I. Mreschar

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 6 July 1982)

Trying to get the best of all worlds

A new branch of medicine called ethnomedicine aims to analyse man's attitudes in various countries and civilisations towaards illness and health.

Ethnomedicine compares cultures, hoping that what is learned will benefit not only the developing nations but the West as well.

It is so new that the latest encyclopedias have no entry on it.

Yet it has been in existence in a way for at least 30 years although it has been of interest primarily to ethnologists and people interested in the more curious aspects of alien civilisations.

An ethnomedical workshop has been in existence at the Ethnological Museum of the Portheim Foundation in Heidelberg since 1970.

The aim is to establish inter-disciplinary cooperation between the various branches of medicine on the one hand and ethnology and sociology on the other.

The workshop is a collection of various institutions, scientists and laymen and now has some 300 German and foreign members.

Since 1978, the organisation has also been publishing a magazine for ethnomedicine and trans-cultural psychiatry called *Curare*.

The name has two roots: the arrow poison (also a major element of modern unaesthetics) and the Latin verb *curare* (to care for).

The magazine is a mouthpiece for the workshop's world-wide effort to improve the image of folk medicine, to examine its practices and to encourage its best features to be adopted into traditional the health systems.

To understand how an ethnological group and its medicine are related everything that relates to illness and health must be regarded as part of the civilisation of the country concerned — very much like its religion, language or art.

Ethnomedicine believes that the development of medicine in a nation is an organic process extending over centuries and a handed-down system that is in harmony with that nation's behavioural patterns in illness and in health. The cultural achievements of folk medicine require no academic support.

A comparison of the attitude towards illness and health in the West and in the developing countries and those of individual peoples shows major differences — not only in the attitude towards illness but also in coping with the fear that goes with it.

Modern Western medicine orientates itself by scientific thought patterns, in physical phenomena that can be weighed and measured.

Ethnomedicine does not say that this is all wrong. Nor does it deny the enormous progress medicine has made this century.

But the realisation that illness concerns not only the body but the mind as well is spreading.

The sick person must be viewed not only as an individual but as part of his *environment and his family*.

It is here that *tradition-steeped* methods of treatment that devote much time and attention to the individual have an edge over soulless technological medicine.

The industrial countries tend to overlook the fact that it was largely the development of health insurance that made many of our medical achievements possible.

Modern Western medicine supplanted the last vestiges of folk medicine by enabling the patient to go to the doctor and get drugs without having to worry about the cost.

But in developing countries, there is little cash available for medicine.

This means that an Indian or African peasant who has broken a leg can't stay for long in hospital because that would ruin his family financially.

Experts estimate that up to 80 per cent of patients in the developing world still make use of traditional folk medicine.

As a result, ethnomedicine suggests a careful analysis of medical pluralism in the developing countries by using both scientific and folk medicine. By overcoming the mutual mistrust between doctors trained in Western medicine and traditional curers it should be possible to build up a system using both approaches.

The magazine *Curare* is promoting this idea by providing comprehensive information on research results, including field research.

This is supported by regular conferences, held since 1973. Some medical schools now also offer lectures and seminars on ethnomedicine.

Elisabeth Hinz

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 10 July 1982)

■ SOCIETY

All everyone has ever wanted to read — and more — about women

Die Frauenfrage in Deutschland, Saur Verlag, Munich; 957pp; DM 148.

This is a book that is going to be mishandled. It will become dog-eared, it will get flecked with coffee. Its 957 pages will become smudged with notes and scribbles.

Thousands of students, academics, journalists politicians and men and women from all walks of life will use it and gain inspiration from it.

Die Frauenfrage in Deutschland is a bibliography containing information on about 12,000 publications about women.

It is claimed to include everything published in the German-speaking world, plus a selection of foreign literature published between 1931 and 1980.

The project was a mammoth sleuthing operation.

The West Berlin magazine *Courage* is as much part of it as the publications of Deutsche Bücherei in Leipzig and the rulings of the Federal Criminal Court in Cologne/Berlin. UN reports are also included.

How did this work that called for decades of patient research come about?

It goes back to the initiative of the *Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund* (Federation of German women academics) whose objective it was to research and document women's problems.

The precursor of this bibliography comprised information on publications between 1926 and 1932. It was completed in 1932, but the Nazi takeover posed a major threat because of the new regime's repression of pre-1933 cultural products.

In order to avoid Nazi *gleichschaltung,* the Federation decided to disband after Hitler came to power.

One of the last things it did was to publish the bibliography, though I don't know whether it ever found its way to library shelves.

The Federation was re-established in 1949 and instantly continued its bibliographical task, publishing sections as they were completed.

The wealth of information contained in the completed bibliography is at first confusing. The user soon becomes seized by an irresistible curiosity and a sense of adventure and discovery.

It is also a bit of social history. The break in the intellectual life caused by the Nazi regime is clearly discernible.

During the misery of the early 1930s, political and economic upheavals, wide differences of opinion were thrown up in Germany, shown by such titles as *Deutsches Frauenstreben. Die deutsche Frau und das Vaterland* (Striving among German Women. The German Women and the Fatherland) rubs shoulders with *Die kollektive Frau* (Collective women).

The *Verlagsgemeinschaft des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes,* a trade union publishing house, published *Die Frau gehört ins Haus! Die Frau gehört ins Haus?* (The Woman belongs in the Home! The Woman belongs in the Home?).

Like today, all political parties wooed women as potential voters.

The Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party) courted women voters with pamphlets like *Frauenfragen der Gegenwart* (Women's questions of our Time); the Social Democrats issued information sheets entitled *Die Genossin* (The Woman comrade) or *Blatt der arbeitenden Frau: Gleichheit* (The Working Woman's paper: Equality).

But there were also idealising publications such as *Die Kultur der Frau. Eine Lebenssymphonie der Frau des 20. Jahrhunders* (Women's culture. A life-symphony of 20th century woman). The title was clearly intended to captivate the imagination and boost sales. But it was an uphill struggle.

A few pages further along the sense of discovery and adventure is dulled. There are titles like *So schaffen wir! Mädeleinsatz in Pflichtjahr* (Thus we Work! Girls in Action during the Duty Year); *Mädel am Westwall* (Girls on the Western Defence Front); *Die altgermanische Frau und wir* (The ancient Germanic Woman and Us); *Die rassenhygienischen Aufgaben des weiblichen Arztes* (The race-hygiene function of the Woman Doctor); *Frauen helfen siegen!* (Women's contribution to Victory!).

What a treasure trove; and what a relief as titles gradually change their tenor the closer we come to our era.

To cope with the wealth of material, the editors had to resort to classifications such as women's magazines; organisations and associations; the woman in society; partnership and marriage; sex; motherhood; child rearing and education; the working woman, etc.

Many of the titles listed show that the authors tried to startle or impress their readership.

For example: *Die Personalität des Menschen in der Bewertung der neueren kirchlichen Ehegerichtsbarkeit. Der actus humanus als wesentlicher Masstab für die sogenannte "impotentia moralis", dargestellt nach der neueren Rechtsprechung der S.R. Rota unter Berücksichtigung der Ehelehre des Zweiten vatikanischen Konzils* (Human personality as assessed by recent ecclesiastic marriage jurisprudence. The "actus humanus as an essential yardstick of the socalled "impotentia moralis" depicted as per the recent ruling by the Rota, taking into account the marriage dogma as seen by the Second Vatican Council).

It was here that I took a break! Afterwards I found an idyll under the heading "Woman's Childhood and Youth". A small sampling of titles: *Rein sein und reif werden* (Being pure and maturing); *Knospen, vom Sinn der Jungmädchenjahre* (Buds, the meaning of Girlhood Years); *Immer froh sein* (Always Happy); *Für die Liebe geschaffen* (Made for Love); *Vom Ringen und Siegen junger Heldinnnen* (Struggle and Victory of Young Women Heros).

The closer to 1980, the more ca[...] and aggressive the titles. For insta[nce] *Kann die Herrschaft der Männer ge[bro]chen werden?* (Can male rule [be] breached?); *Schön ist die erotische [Be]wegung eines angstlosen Körpers* ([The] Beauty of the Erotic Movements o[f a] Fearless Body); *Stachel im Fle[isch]* (Thorn in the Flesh); *Über die Be[zie]hungen von Liebesverhältnissen u[nd] Mittelstreckenraketen* (The interplay [of] Romance and Medium-Range Mi[ssi]les). The index alone covers 140 page[s].

I tested the work by looking for M[a]thilde Vaerting's timeless book *Die w[eib]liche Eigenart im Männerstaat und [die] männliche Eigenart im Frauenstaat* ([Fe]male Character in a Male State a[nd] Male Character in a Female State).

The book has a chapter on cloth[es as] expression and instrument of pow[er].

DIE WELT

According to the author, the peo[ple] who appears in the nude or who can [be] persuaded to wear revealing clothes [is] always the underdog. Nakedness le[ads] to an attitude of subjection via m[any] devious paths.

This is the conclusion the controver[sial] woman sociologist reached in 192[.].

The booklet can still be bought fr[om] its publisher, Frauenselbstverlag, Be[r]lin, as the bibliography tells us.

All that remains to be said is that the editors, Dorothea Frandsen and Ilse Delvendahl, have done a splendid piec[e] of work. In short: a masterpiece.

Esther Knorr-Anders

(Die Welt, 7 July 19[82])

The lessons and the messages lurking in fairy tales

Fairy tales don't necessarily belong in some distant past even though many of them depict women as submissive.

There are also those that describe rebellious step-daughters and self-assured princesses who courageously take a stand against traditional ways of upbringing and their environment and who insist on having their say in married life.

These "progressive" depictions of women in fairy tales are spotlighted in an essay on sex-related fairy tale attitudes by psychologists Dr Dorothee Bierhoff-Alfermann, Simone Brandt and Angelika Kittel of Giessen University in the magazine *Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht.*

The "census" the authors made in the realm of fairies and magicians has come up with some surprises. In the 80 fairy tales under review, there are 41 per cent females, meaning that that sex is not under-represented — especially when compared with the 26 per cent in German school readers, where they clearly play a secondary role.

The analysis of character traits also came up with some startling results.

Thus, for instance, males are more frequently described as courageous and independent than females. But the females are more often depicted as rebellious.

This is the more surprising as disobedience and rebelliousness in folk lore is always subject to punishment while

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obedience is rewarded, regardless of sex.

Perhaps, the authors speculate, the female fairy tale characters are judged only by their obedient or disobedient behaviour while corresponding actions of male characters are seen as part of other qualities that play a role in judging them.

Other findings correspond to conventional views. Intellect is more emphasised in males than in females. The male fairy tale hero's destiny is determined by the amount of brains he has while female destinies depend on looks.

Beauty is usually the criterion if personal value, more or less along the lines of "anybody who is beautiful must also be good."

This, the authors say, secretly dominates real romance as well. Beautiful women are automatically endowed with pleasing characteristics while their ugly sisters are stereotyped as having all the nasty traits.

In 32 of the fairy tales reviewed, beauty in women resulted in positive consequences and only in two did it lead to unwelcome effects. The fairy tales do not specifically depict the consequences of ugliness.

Riches are detrimental to fairy tale females and spoil their characters.

Not so with men. Here, wealth do[es] not matter and its blessings or curs[es] are balanced.

Poverty goes well with both men an[d] women and in most cases earns the[m] moral approbation.

As in reality, the fairy tale wife is [es]sentially a housewife while the husb[and] is the provider.

Even so, the fairy tale husband do[es] not have a noticeably dominating po[si]tion. Both are shown equally often [in] their function as spouse and pare[nt]. The father's child rearing function [is] held in high esteem.

In about half of all controversial [up]bringing issues the final decision [is] made by the husband. And almost [al]ways it is he who picks a husband [for] his daughter. Sons, on the other ha[nd] are much more frequently at liberty [to] marry the woman of their choice.

Even though fairy tales frequen[tly] show a lopsided picture of the se[xes] and their respective authority, the [au]thors conclude that some of them dep[ict] more balanced behavioural patterns.

In ten per cent of the reviewed ta[les] husband and wife tackle decisi[ons] jointly.

A nice example of this is provided [by] "Tom Thumb" with its passage that s[ays] that the two helpless parents, hav[ing] put their children to bed, discuss[ed] what had to be done and deci[ded] that...

The very fact that fairy tales get to [the] point and clearly state what is good [and] evil and because of their clear patte[rns] of values, make them a suitable inst[ru]ment of education and upbringing, [the] authors say.

They show traditional roles of [the] sexes and so make them a suitable su[b]ject of discussion.

Rolf Dege[...]

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 10 July 19[82])

■ SECURITY

Exporting the expertise to handle rebellion

The Federal government in Bonn has delivered, or is delivering, operational equipment and expertise for police forces in about 30 nations in various parts of the world. In recent years, most have been African nations. About two dozen experts each year follow up the equipment deliveries with advice. Heavily sought is the expertise that goes to make up an anti-terror operation squad . . .

German anti-terror experts and instructors are in international demand.

Particular interest has focused on the [spe]cial GSG 9 anti-terror squad, which [ca]me to fame following the spectacular [fr]eeing of hostages in Mogadishu, So[m]alia, in 1977.

Exporting this sort of expertise is a [de]licate matter and has been at the cen[tre] of much political and moral debate.

Since professional training of this na[tu]re is associated with exports of arms, [the] German authorities face similar problems.

How flexible can a democratic coun[try] be over exports of this kind? Is there [a] guarantee against the misuse by less democratic countries.

The list of supplies is a long one: walkie-talkies, police cars, laboratories [an]d equipment for police training [cen]tres, all a part of one of Germany's [bes]t selling export articles, internal se[cur]ity "made in Germany".

Ever since the audacious freeing of [ho]stages on a Somalian runway in 1977, [the] *Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA), the Ger[m]an Federal CID, and in particular its [an]ti-terror squad, the GSG 9, have been [in]undated with requests to train and [equ]ip security foces in other countries.

Politicians in Bonn are faced with the [tri]cky decisions.

German Interior Minister Gerhart [Ba]um says: "Determining the limits to [su]ch decisions is just as difficult as in [the] case of arms exports."

Baum is really only responsible for [co]operation with police forces in other [co]untries. On providing equipment he [on]ly acts as an agent of the German [Fo]reign Office, which must base its de[cisi]on on criteria of foreign policy when [dec]iding which countries should receive [su]pplies.

[A]bout DM 10 million is set aside in [th]e budget for this each year.

Decisions are made with discretion [an]d without public explanation.

As state minister Peter Corterier ex[pla]ined to the independent Member of [Par]liament Heinz Coppik during a de[bate] in the *Bundestag* in March: "Cooperation in the field of police acti[vi]ties has as its guiding principle the de[vel]opment of constitutional structures, [in] particular the principle of using rea[son]able mens to fight crime."

This was all Corterier had to say, for [th]e specific details are worked out [wi]th the recipient country on a strictly [con]fidential basis".

There is reason enough for such dis[cret]ion. The recipient countries, about [30,] are not all the most democratic.

The suppliers in Bonn know the risk [tha]t walkie-talkies, observation vehicles [an]d other police equipment might not be used to combat crime or to track [dow]n drug traffickers. Political oppo[nent]s may well be at the receiving end.

The underlying political calculation [beh]ind providing equipment and train[ing] is that is will lead to greater proxi[mit]y to the smaller countries in Africa [and] the Arab World, thus improving [the] chances of exerting a political in[flu]ence.

In addition, Bonn thinks that only a [well]-equipped police force will be able [to] react in a balanced way. Politicians [als]o point towards the many personal [con]tacts set up between the German in[stru]ctors and their trainees, which have [ofte]n proved advantageous in the inter[nati]onal fight against serious crime.

As soon as the go-ahead has been [give]n by the Foreign Office, the practi[cal] implementation of training is up to [the] Ministry of the Interior.

[I]ts experts are responsible for on-the-spot checking of the equipment which has been ordered.

In many cases what the younger developing countries want is not exactly realistic.

One country asked for a police control centre to be built, even though there was a total lack of a corresponding infrastructure.

In yet another country, the newly delivered motorcycles were found standing around in a shed: the batteries were empty.

At present, for example, a member of the German Federal Border Guard (BGS) is carrying out a 2-week motorcycle training course in an attempt to help remove this lack of expertise.

Bonn's equipment aid programme is usually planned on a long-term basis.

In Algeria, for example, Germany has been helping set up a directional radio network together with an urban VHF network in Algiers since 1969. North Yemen has shown interest in walkie-talkies, and Jordan has asked for a telecommunications workshop and two sets of instruments for checking technical equipment. Benin and Lesotho are to receive police cars. Kenya would like to have a special unit of observation vehicles. Whether it's Somalia, Tunisia or somewhere else, most are interested in removing their lack of communication and mobility.

Vehicles and telecommunictions equipment have been the mainstays of German aid.

However, sudden political changes can upset the most careful political intentions, as Soviet intervention in Afghanistan underlined.

Up until this time, Afghanistan was one of the most heavily supported countries. It received intense police training; laboratories; vehicles; school facilities.

The German government was backed by completely different motives for its decision to allocate DM4m, later DM2m, to attempts to stem the illegal imports of drugs via action in the cultivating and transit countries themselves.

The *Bundeskriminalamt* paid special attention to Bulgaria, a country which has shown itself to be particularly cooperative during the seventies, when it was quick to extradite four German terrorists.

Many drug traffickers in transit through the Balkans with hash or heroin have felt the effects of such close cooperation.

There are therefore specific German interests behind the present BKA training of Bulgarian drugs experts and the provision of laboratories and other equipment to the Balkan state.

All parties involved realise that the basis for such activities is a shaky one, not only in a political sense. Yugoslavia, which is not the best of friends with Bulgaria, is also interested in German help to fight its drugs problem.

The installation of equipment for controlling heavy goods vehicles by Germany, a venture worth DM1.5m, has still not been decided on.

Experienced experts are still not convinced of the effectivity of such equipment.

Aid planned for Turkey has again proved to be matter requiring a particularly careful approach.

Since 1969 Turkey has been receiving DM16m worth of used German police equipment.



The kid gloves come off. (Photo: dpa)

The Turks are now interested in bulletproof vests, protective blankets against bomb attacks and more vehicles, but talks on the existing agreement between both countries have been slow.

An increasing number of countries have asked for German instructors to train their police forces.

In this case the BKA is not tormented by political qualms. Interior Minister Baum refers to the annual training of about two dozen foreign policemen in fingerprinting, modern laboratory techniques and other special subjects as an important contribution towards cooperating in the fight against serious crime.

Such crash courses are financed by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation. Some countries, however, such as the rich oil-exporting states, pay for sending their police to be trained in Germany.

One example cited by Baum of such cooperation paying off is Libya, which has helped a great deal in fighting terrorism.

Among other things this is put back to the fact that over the years 20 Libyan police have been trained by the BKA.

The absolute best-seller of exports of internal security training is beyond doubt the special GSG 9 anti-terror squad.

Even before its spectacular liberation of hostages in 1977 this unit had trained foreign groups.

The commandant of the Swiss canton police in Aargau is just one of many. Following the dramatic mission in Mogadishu, however, the demand for training by this squad became overwhelming.

According to Ulrich Wegener, leader of the unit, 60 countries had filed their requests for German training just six months after the dramatic rescue.

Wegener is long since the most travelled German policeman. Since 1977 he and his team have trained over a thousand specialists in about 30 countries, from Austria to Somalia, from the USA to Singapore.

Wegener expressed his deep respect for his Chinese colleagues in Singapore ("tough and intelligent").

Following the occupation of the the mosque in Mecca, most of the GSG 9 activities have moved to Saudi Arabia.

At great expense the Saudis not only commissioned Wegener and his group to train special units, but also set up a modern training and accommodation centre, calling on the support of German firms.

Twelve members of the GSG 9 squad learnt the Arab language especially for this purpose.

Training foreign anti-terror experts at home and abroad has often presented the GSG 9 with new and unusual problems. Hot and unaccustomed climates, bad food for the trainees, lack of basic sporting training and lack of an understanding about modern technology: all problems which demand particular skill and an appreciation of the specific difficulties in each country.

Ulrich Wegener regards all these efforts as an important contribution towards fighting international terrorism.

In the process he himself has set up many international contacts, a valuable asset in times of danger.

Is the exporting of internal security more than must aid for neighbours and friends the world over? There's no doubt about it: the training and equipping of police in many countries is a part of foreign policy for which there are no sure-fire criteria. It will therefore always remain controversial in individual cases. One thing always calms the critics down: "The supply of weapons and munitions is absolutely out of the question."

There are many good reasons for sticking to this principle.

Karl-Heinz Krumm

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 July 1982)